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 1 
Summary 
The findings of this thesis suggest that there appears to be a bad spiral. In 
countries with a lot of natural resources and poorly developed socio-
economic structures, there is a present tendency to lower environmental 
protection laws in order to attract foreign investors by creating market 
oriented regulations. Investors and managers of multinational corporations 
will reduce production costs by moving the production to countries with 
lower environmental protection. This perceived bad spiral results in a 
disincentive for the least developed countries in the world to raise their 
environmental standards. In combination with the overarching impediment 
of corruption, the development of international environmental law applied 
to multinational corporations seems constrained, and the global 
environmental degradation still remains. 
 
There is empirical research showing the results of increased pollution in 
developing countries with high levels of corruption, in comparison to 
developing countries with lower levels of corruption. Specifically, a 
correlation has been found between corruption and environmental 
degradation on a micro level. These findings taken up on a macro level 
might show that the development in international environmental law with a 
focus on multinational corporations is similar to that seen in the example of 
Wal-Mart in Mexico.  
 
By assessing the complex structure of corruption and the plethora for it, in 
combination with the global environmental protection in international law 
focused on multinational corporations, there might be ways of decreasing 
the level of corruption and therefore increase the international 
environmental protection by giving the regulations greater impact through 
making the rule of law impartial.  
 
The way is still long, but the end-goal is not out of reach.  
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Sammanfattning 
Upptäckterna i den här uppsatsen föreslår att det finns ett mönster av en 
negativ spiral. I utvecklingsländer med omfattande naturresurser men 
mindre utvecklade socioekonomiska strukturer, finns det en tendens att 
sänka kraven i miljölagarna för att på så sätt kunna attrahera utländska 
investerare genom att applicera marknadsorienterade regler. Investerare och 
företagsledare för multinationella företag kommer att minska sina 
produktionskostnader genom att flytta produktionen till länder med lägre 
miljökrav, därför är också miljöskyddet lägre. Effekten av den negativa 
spiralen tar bort incitament för utvecklingsländer att höja miljöskyddet 
genom mer strikta miljölagar som skulle leda till en förhöjd miljöstandard. I 
kombination med korruption som ett övergripande hinder för utvecklingen i 
både samhällen och således också den internationella miljörätten, med fokus 
på multinationella företag, blir utvecklingen hämmad, och den globala 
degradationen av miljön är fortfarande närvarande.     
Empirisk forskning från utvecklingsländer visar att utsläppen är större i 
länder med mer korruption, i jämförelse med länder där korruptionen är 
lägre. Mer specifikt har alltså den empiriska forskningen visat att det finns 
en korrelation mellan korruption och ökade utsläpp i utvecklingsländer på 
en mikronivå. Sett till nämnda resultat, upptaget på en makronivå, kan dessa 
påvisa att påverkan av korruption på den internationella miljörätten med ett 
fokus på multinationella företag är densamma sett till exemplet med Wal-
Mart i Mexico. 
Genom att bedöma hur den komplexa strukturen och botemedlet för 
korruption ser ut, i kombination med det globala miljörättsliga skyddet i 
internationell rätt, finns det ett par lösningar för att minska korruption, och 
på så sätt ge de internationella miljörättsliga reglerna större genomslag 
eftersom att ’the rule of law’ då appliceras opartiskt.   
Vägen är fortfarande lång att gå, men slutmålet är inte helt utom räckhåll. 
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1 Introduction  
It is commonly presumed that corruption is bad, but perhaps more rarely do 
we ask for the reason why corruption is bad. One reason is that corruption is 
known to be a large impediment for the development of a society.1 The 
main non-governmental organisation (hereafter NGO) working in anti-
corruption, Transparency International (hereafter TI), has affirmed this 
reason by defining that corruption is ‘the abuse of entrusted power for 
personal gain’, both in the public and private sector.2   
 
In societies where high levels of corruption occur, citizens tend to rely less 
on the state’s ability to provide justice. For Aristotle, justice meant ‘treating 
every case alike’,3 which turned into modern terms, is the same as a states’ 
‘effort to give each person his or her rights’.4 Morigiwa agrees with this and 
has defined justice as ‘the sustainable effort to give each person his or her 
rights’.5 
 
Social and economic development in a society is dangerously impacted by 
corruption, leading to the constant state of the poorest in the world 
remaining poor.6 In some countries with high levels of corruption, pollution 
has found to be increased in comparison to the pollution in less corrupted 
countries. It has been suggested that by decreasing corruption, developing 
countries might be able to improve their economic and environmental 
                                                
1 Yasutomo Morigiwa, ‘Making Deivery a Priority:A Philosophical Perspective on 
Corruption and a Strategy for Remedy’ (2015) 6 The World Bank Legal Review 437.   
2 Transparency International ‘what we do’, retrieved: <https://www.transparency.org/what-
is-corruption> 
3 Britannica Academic, ‘justice’, retrieved: 2018-02-19 
<http://academic.eb.com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/levels/collegiate/article/472661> 
4 Cissé, Hassane, Doherty Teresa, Ninio, Wouters, Jan, ‘The World Bank Legal Review 
Volume 6: Improving Delivery in Development – The Role of Voice, Social Contract, and 
Accountability’ (2015,World Bank Group, Geneva) 438.  
5 Yasutomo Morigiwa, ‘Making Deivery a Priority:A Philosophical Perspective on 
Corruption and a Strategy for Remedy’ (2015) 6 The World Bank Legal Review 438. 
6 Hana Ivanhoe, ‘The next generation of ‘fair trade’ – A Human Rights Framework for 
Combating Corporate Corruption in Global Supply Chains’ 157-181 in Bård A. Andreassen 
and Võ Khán Vinh, Duties Across Borders – Advancing Human Rights in Transnational 
Business (Intersentia Ltd, United Kingdom, 2016) 159. 
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performance.7 Welsch has highlighted that reducing corruption can be of 
‘key importance for improving environmental quality, especially in 
developing countries’.8  
 
From a micro perspective, corruption is an impediment for improving 
environmental standards in countries that need it the most. In a corrupt 
society, where each citizen’s possibility of a fair and just treatment depends 
upon his or her status or position, and where the expectation of justice has 
been replaced by an expectation of similar treatment for everybody with the 
same status, there will become certain elite-groups that monopolize the 
powers of domination and sources of income.9  Moving from a micro to a 
macro perspective, this systemic political behaviour might correlate with the 
slow development of international environmental protection in the aspect of 
multinational corporations.  
 
Elis and Lee suggest that in some states, there has been a paradigm shift of 
power from states to large multinational corporations, where states ‘may 
find themselves constrained in exercising freedom of choice in particular 
situations involving unequal power relations’ between them and 
multinational corporations. In these situations, much of the control over 
private actors’ activities has shifted from the states to the economic power 
state of multinational corporations. There are corporations that have larger 
annual revenues than the GDP of some countries. Such a company is for 
example General Motors that has larger annual revenue than the GDP of 
Thailand and Portugal.10  
 
                                                
7 Heinz Welsch ‘Corruption, growth, and the environment: a cross-country analysis’ (2004) 
9 Environment and Development Economics 663. 
8 ibid 685. 
9 Alina Mungiu–Pippidi, ‘Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment’ (2006) 17(3) Journal of 
Democracy 88. 
10 Juanita Elias and Robert Lee, ‘Ecological Modernisation and Environmental Regulation: 
Corporate Compliance and Accountability’ 163-181 in Sorcha MacLeod, Global 
Governance and the Quest for Justice – Volume 2: Corporate Governance (Hart 
Publishing, USA, 2006) 181 and 173. 
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Responding to this paradigm shift is a new type of re-regulation, so called 
‘market orientated regulations’ that involves different types of interventions 
in the market. Significant for market oriented regulations, compared to 
standard regulations, is that instead of requiring corporations to comply 
with a specific regulation, the corporations are left to respond to it. There 
are always two sides of the regulation. The first side is that it ‘weakens rule-
directed models of corporate governance in favour of process altering’. The 
second side is that this type of re-regulation ‘eases state direction of 
business’.11 As a consequence, this tendency in less developed countries can 
lead to the result that domestic laws are being adapted in order to attract 
corporations from more developed economies, without precautions for 
environmental degradation.  
 
1.1 Purpose and Research Questions  
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate if (1) there is any type of 
correlation between corruption and the development in international 
environmental law, with a focus applied on the sustainability of 
multinational corporations. If any type of correlation is to be found, this 
thesis will (2) focus on if there could be any way to curb the development 
by using international legal instruments. To contextualise this, the focus of 
this thesis will lay on international environmental law and sustainable 
development, corruption and how it eradicates the social contract, and the 
responsibility of corporations pursuance of sustainable conduction in 
international environmental law.  
 
Given the purpose of this thesis, the research questions are:  
1. Is there a correlation between corruption and the development of 
international environmental law applied to multinational 
                                                
11 Juanita Elias and Robert Lee, ‘Ecological Modernisation and Environmental Regulation: 
Corporate Compliance and Accountability’ 163-181 in Sorcha MacLeod, Global 
Governance and the Quest for Justice – Volume 2: Corporate Governance (Hart 
Publishing, USA, 2006) 169-170. 
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corporations seen to the globally increased environmental 
degradation? 
2. Would there be a way to curb the development of international 
environmental law applied to multinational corporations that would 
at the same time lessen corruption, through use of international legal 
instruments? 
 
1.2 Methodology and Material  
The methodology that I have chosen to apply on this thesis is sociology of 
law. The reason for this is that this method allows an investigation 
concerning the way of how rules are applied in practice, and furthermore, 
the effect of the application.12 Sociology of law was chosen instead of using 
the traditional legal approach (the legal dogmatic method), which would 
have allowed only an investigation on the reason behind the laws and how 
to apply these, whilst sociology allow taking the assessment a step further. 
There are some elements of the traditional legal method, although it is not 
the main methodology used in this thesis. Furthermore, the methodology of 
sociology of law allows assessing international law, corruption and the role 
of multinational corporations from an external perspective.13 
 
In order to make a just assessment of this broad subject, the material that has 
been used in investigating international law is first and foremost 
‘Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law’, 8th edition, by James 
Crawford,14 since this is a recent compilation of the work of a very well 
renowned scholar in international law, Ian Brownlie. Following, in the area 
of international environmental law, the material of Ulrich Beyerlin and 
                                                
12 Fredric Korling and Mauro Zamboni, ’Juridisk Metodlära’ (Studentlitteratur AB, Lund, 
2013) 208. 
13 ibid 209. 
14 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edition, Oxford 
University Press, United Kingom, 2012). 
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Thilo Marauhn, mainly ‘International Environmental Law’,15 was of great 
value when examining the essential building blocks of international 
environmental law and soft law mechanisms.  
 
The material used in order to assess corruption and contextualise the 
structure and obstacles of this phenomenon, the work by Bo Rothstein 
together with Marcus Tannenberg, such as ‘Making Development Work: 
The Quality of Government Approach’,16 was of great use. This work in 
combination with the articles of Yasutomo Morigiwa,17 and Alina Mungiu-
Pippidi,18 helped deconstruct corruption and explain how to find a plethora 
for it. These previously mentioned authors together helped contribute with 
structures, empirical research and theories on different ways of eradicating 
corruption and explain how corruption is an impediment to the development 
of a society.  
 
Furthermore, the material used for assessing the effect of the contemporary 
international environmental laws, and the effect of corruption in correlation 
with the environment, was ‘The Principle of Sustainability – Transforming 
Law and Governance’ by Klaus Bosselmann.19  Finally, the material of 
Juanita Elias and Robert Lee,20 in combination with the revolutionary work 
by Polly Higgins,21 was of great use in analysing potential strategies for 
making an improvement in strengthening international environmental 
protection rules.  
                                                
15 Ulrich Beyerlin and Thilo Marauhn, International Environmental Law (Hart Publishing 
Ltd, USA, 2011). 
16 Bo Rothstein and Marcus Tannenberg, Making Development Work: The Quality of 
Government Approach (Elanders Sverige AB, Stockholm, 2015). 
17 Yasutomo Morigiwa, ‘Making Deivery a Priority:A Philosophical Perspective on 
Corruption and a Strategy for Remedy’ (2015) 6 The World Bank Legal Review 437-455. 
18 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Becoming Denmark: Historical Designs of Corruption Control’ 
(2013) 80(4) Social Research – Corruption, Accountability, and Transparency 1259-1286. 
19 Klaus Bosselmann, The Principle of Sustainability – Transforming Law and Governance 
(Ashgate Publishing Ltd, England, 2008). 
20 Juanita Elias and Robert Lee, ‘Ecological Modernisation and Environmental Regulation: 
Corporate Compliance and Accountability’ 163-181 in Sorcha MacLeod, Global 
Governance and the Quest for Justice – Volume 2: Corporate Governance (Hart 
Publishing, USA, 2006). 
21 Polly Higgins, Eradicating Ecocide – Exposing the corporate and political practices 
destroying the planet and proposing the laws to eradicate ecocide (2nd edition, Shepheard-
Walwyn (Publishers) Ltd, 2015). 
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1.3 State of research 
There is a lot of material on the three different subjects separately, but not 
overwhelmingly much on how corruption is an impediment to the 
development of international environmental law applied on multinational 
corporations. However, there are elements, theories and patterns that can be 
combined in order to provide a solution. On all three different subjects there 
are a lot of material and I have tried to extract which scholars that are the 
most distinguished, mixed with new thoughts that to some extent can be 
considered to be a bit controversial and new. 
 
1.4 Delimitation 
International law and international environmental law are enormously large 
subjects, hence, there are principles, treaties, resolutions, cases, material and 
much more that are not mentioned due to limitation of space and time in this 
thesis. The reason why sustainable development has been assessed 
thoroughly is because this is the founding principle in international 
environmental law. In addition to this, sustainable development is 
complemented and strengthened by the ‘no-harm principle’ and the’ polluter 
pays principle’, since these principles provide legal consequences for the 
state causing harm.  
 
In the case of corruption, it has been given an overview, and not a deepening 
example of one country, since the focus of this thesis is on the international 
community. However, the patterns and theories given have been extracted 
from particular countries that have managed to lessen corruption and restore 
their social contract.  
 
Finally, why there is a focus on multinational corporations, and not 
corporations in general, is because multinational corporations are those with 
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largest resources, and therefore are the ones of interest, since they can make 
the most impact if change is made.  
 
1.5 Disposition 
To begin with, chapter 2 provides a short section of definitions in order to 
orient the reader and clarify some key terms to facilitate further reading.  
 
The following first part of this thesis, chapter 3, is divided into two parts:  
(1) an overview of the general international law, the most important sources 
of both international law and international environmental law, and (2) 
thereafter follows an assessment of sustainable development and its history, 
sources and interpretation of the concept of sustainable development. Both 
the importance of state sovereignty and the no-harm principle will be put 
forth, together with the respective functions of these founding principles. An 
overview is important in order to give the reader an understanding of the 
complexity of international law, in what way international environmental 
law has sprung out of it, they way sustainable development has gained 
importance the last 40 years, how soft law works and why the main part of 
international environmental law is built on soft law. 
 
Following this, in chapter 4, a presentation of how corruption deteriorates 
societies and eradicates the social contract is given. This is contextualising 
the correlation between corruption and environmental degradation, which is 
twofold: (1) the lack of legal environmental protection, and (2) how 
corruption deteriorates these rules by eradicating the social contract, which 
leads to the effect that the rule of law becomes partial and therefore the rules 
are no longer respected by all citizens in a society.  
 
Furthermore, in chapter 5, this thesis presents the ways in which 
multinational corporations can be held responsible in international law. In 
order to do this, an explanation of the relationship between the multinational 
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corporation’s ‘home state’ and ‘host state’ is provided, and the difference in 
the perspective of responsibility for the multinational corporation. This is 
essential in order to understand which state bears the legal responsibility and 
right to hold a multinational corporation accountable for its damaging 
actions in its own, or another state. 
 
The analysis in chapter 6 is built on what has been presented in earlier 
chapters and tries to (1) establish a correlation between corruption and 
increased global environmental degradation caused by multinational 
corporations, and if (2) it would be possible to curb this development 
through using international legal instruments, and in what way that would 
be possible.  
 
The reason for the final chapter, ‘concluding remarks’, is to provide space to 
add some personal thoughts and reflections on the subject. 
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2 Definintions  
In order to present my arguments in this thesis in the clearest way possible, 
and before I start to investigate the problem around which this thesis 
revolves, there are some terms that need to be clarified. The purpose of 
clarifying these terms is to show in what sense I will employ them in this 
thesis.  
 
To begin with, the term sustainable development within international 
environmental law is a term that emerged from the report ‘Our Common 
Future’ (1987), which is commonly, referred to as the Brundtland Report.22 
It is defined therein as ‘development that meets the need of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs’.23 A development of this is ‘emphasizing the importance of 
integrating environmental protection within economic activity’,24 both 
definitions will be of relevance.      
 
Secondly, one of the key terms for the content of this thesis is: corruption. 
The definition of corruption that I will adhere to comes from TI, who 
defines corruption as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’.25 In 
comparison with the definition given by the World Bank (hereafter WB), 
which defines corruption as  ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’,26 
there is an extension in the range of TI’s definition because it captures both 
the public and the private sector.27 
 
                                                
22 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edition, Oxford 
University Press, UK, 2012) 358. 
23 World Commission on Environment and Development, ‘Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future’ (Oslo, March 20, 
1987) 41. 
24 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edition, Oxford 
University Press, UK, 2012) 364. 
25 Martine Boersma, Corruption: A Violation of Human Rights and a Crime Under 
International Law? (Intersentia Ltd, UK, 2012) 27. 
26 ibid 28. 
27 ibid 27-28. 
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Finally, the third term that needs to be clarified is corporate governance. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  (hereafter 
OECD) has taken their definition of corporate governance from the 
European Central Bank. They define it ‘as the procedures and processes 
according to which an organisation is directed and controlled. The corporate 
governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities 
among the different participants in the organisation – such as the board, 
managers, shareholders and other shareholders – and lays down the rules 
and procedures for decision-making’,28 which is the definition that will be 
used in this thesis, and will mainly be of importance for chapter 5.  
                                                
28 European Central Bank, ‘Annual Report 2004’ (ISSN 1725-2865, Germany, 2004) 220. 
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3 Sustainability in international 
environmental law  
In order to be able to assess properly the instruments of international 
environmental law, I must first provide the reader with an overview of the 
structure of international law. I have divided this chapter in two parts due to 
the fact that international environmental law is sprung out of international 
law. It is more pedagogic to first provide a description of international law 
and then continue into international environmental law, how soft law works, 
sustainable development and the most important principles in international 
environmental law. This is important and will be used in order to provide 
solutions in the following analysis in chapter 6.  
 
3.1 PART I – The structure of international 
law  
International law is the legal structure for dealing with the relationship and 
interactions between states.29 International law is created horizontally, 
which means that there is no supra-state law-maker but rather the states 
themselves that decide what rules they should be bound by through 
international customary law and/or international conventions and treaties.30 
International law for instance regulates issues concerning international 
borders between states, and the use of force among states.31 During the 
course of the 20th century, international law expanded so to include 
international organisations of universal membership with treaty-making 
powers, such as the United Nations (hereafter UN). This development led 
inter alia to the possibility to settle international disputes in permanent 
                                                
29 Vaughan Lowe, International Law – A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 
UK, 2015) 18. 
30 ibid 19.  
31 ibid 18. 
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bodies (including disputes between states and private bodies) and to the 
recognition and emergence of international environmental law.32  
 
International law is not just sets of rules; it has the characteristics of a 
system. The issues of sources of international law, legal personality, 
interpretation of treaties and rules, and state responsibility are providing a 
framework for where rules can be generated, how they can be applied and 
what body has the jurisdiction to adjudicate. According to Crawford, this 
system is institutionally deficient, due to the absence of ‘a legislature with 
universal authority and the consensual basis for judicial jurisdiction that 
reinforce the voluntarist and co-operative character of most international 
law most of the time’.33 
 
3.1.1 The main sources of international law 
There are four sources of law listed in article 38(1) in the Statue of the 
International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ Statute); (1) customary 
international law; (2) treaties; (3) general principles of law; and (4) ‘judicial 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as a 
subsidiary means for determination of rules of law’.34 These sources of 
international law are said to lack any hierarchy. Despite this, customary 
international law and treaties are usually considered as the two main sources 
of international law.35 
 
3.1.1.1 International customary law  
There are two keys in establishing international customary law. The first 
one lies in the regularity of a certain, identified practice. It is of great 
importance that there is ‘no significant divergent practice or opposition to 
                                                
32 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edition, Oxford 
University Press, UK, 2012) 6. 
33 ibid 16. 
34 ibid 6. 
35 Vaughan Lowe, International Law – A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 
UK, 2015) 19.  
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the rule’.36 The requirement for a practice to be considered customary 
international law is substantial uniformity, not complete uniformity. Nor is a 
long practice necessary, if the substantial uniformity is installed and if the 
practice has been ‘extensive and virtually uniform of the provisions 
invoked’.37 
 
The second key to create international customary law is opinio iuris. There 
are numerous ways to find out what opinio iuris is: see what state officials 
are saying in relation to the application of a certain rule, searching for clear 
statements from governments on the view of a certain rule, or in the 
literature of international law.38 The ICJ construe opinio iuris from its own 
judgements, from other tribunals’ judgements, from a general practice or 
from scholarly consensus.39 Customary international law is a powerful 
instrument, although it can be imprecise and time consuming to create.40   
 
3.1.1.2 Treaties – codified international customary law  
International law can be codified in treaties.41 These codifications can be 
resolutions of the United Nations (hereafter UN), the conclusions of 
international conferences, and drafts adopted by the International Legal 
Commission (hereafter the ILC). The drafts adopted by the ILC ‘have direct 
influence on the content of law’.42  
 
The most common way to create a treaty is when states enter into bi- or 
multilateral negotiations, where the desirable outcome would consist of a 
                                                
36 Vaughan Lowe, International Law – A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 
UK, 2015) 21. 
37 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edition, Oxford 
University Press, UK, 2012) 24. 
38 Vaughan Lowe, International Law – A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 
UK, 2015) 22.  
39 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edition, Oxford 
University Press, UK, 2012) 26. 
40 Vaughan Lowe, International Law – A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 
UK, 2015) 28. 
41 ibid 25. 
42 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edition, Oxford University 
Press, United States, 2008) 12.  
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new treaty.43 The essential source of obligations in international law is 
treaties,44 which are agreements between states that are legally binding. 
States use treaties to set out their rights and obligations in a clear and 
precise manner. Even though some treaties have taken years to negotiate, 
making treaties are faster than waiting for new customary international law 
to arise.45  
 
In the entering of a treaty, states have the possibility to make reservations 
through clauses on what not to apply from a treaty,46 commonly known as 
‘opt-outs’.47 This is a way of assigning more states to a treaty without 
having to compromise the content of the treaty; instead the width of 
application is compromised.48 The modifications will only be applied in the 
relationship between the states that have agreed to enter into the treaty. 
Guidance on how to create, interpret, terminate and validate a treaty is 
governed by the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (hereafter 
VCLT).49  
 
The eighth paragraph of the preamble of the VCLT states that the rules of 
customary international law govern questions not regulated in the VCLT. 
However, the extent to exactly how much of the customary international law 
that is regulated by the VCLT is unclear, since states, non-parties of the 
VCLT, courts and tribunals rely upon the VCLT in negotiations and before 
concluding a treaty.50 As of March 2017, only 114 states out of the UN’s 
193 members are parties to the VCLT. The United States signed the 
convention in 1970 but the Senate did not approve the convention as 
required by the UN, despite this the United States generally considers ‘many 
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provisions’ of the VCLT to constitute customary international law on the 
law of treaties.51  
 
The general opinion of the history of the VCLT are that it constitutes a 
codification of the ‘pre-existing practices, precedents and doctrines’, 
however, some elements were added or created by the ILC with the 
intention of transforming them into an integral part of international 
customary law and the law of treaties with the intent that these provisions 
would ‘involve progressive development in international law.52 Through this 
division, the codification of international law and the provisions which 
involve progressive development of international law, the conclusion arises 
that not all provisions of the VCLT constitutes international customary law. 
This is the reason why the United States does not recognise ‘all’ provisions 
of the VCLT as customary international law, but only ‘many provisions’. At 
the present time it is not clear exactly which provisions of the VCLT that 
constitute customary international and which do not.53   
 
A state becomes part of a treaty by ratification.54 As a result of not ratifying 
a treaty, a state cannot invoke the dispute settlement provisions in the treaty, 
nor can it be protected from other states misbehaving against the treaty. 
However, if a customary international rule is arguably the same as in the 
treaty, the state has the right to invoke the provision in question.55  
 
The propositions from the ILC that do not become treaties can instead be 
adopted as resolutions, and become noted by the United Nations General 
Assembly (hereafter UN General Assembly). Resolutions from the UN 
General Assembly may be influential when referred to by courts, tribunals 
and diplomats, leading to the resolutions being considered as authoritative 
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statements of international law.56 Despite the referrals, a resolution cannot 
make international law. This does not mean that resolutions have no legal 
significance at all, since they are cited as convenient pronunciations of the 
rules within international law. Some resolutions bear an enormous amount 
of weight due to hard and long negotiations in attempts to try and articulate 
a foundation for international law.57  
 
3.1.2 The main source of international 
environmental law 
International law is the only tool at our disposal for addressing international 
environmental problems and the main part of the regulations consist of soft 
law. The environment is both indivisible and divided, at the same time it is 
shared and partitioned.58 ‘Soft law’ qualifies as ‘agreements without 
immediate international binding force’.59   
 
International rules and principles from treaties and customary international 
law can be very broad. Hence the existence of other instruments that have 
worked out the technicalities and mediated these rules, in order to give a 
more detailed meaning when the rules are to be implemented. For example, 
would there be a difference between a ship that discharges 1 000 litres of oil 
during a world-wide voyage, or a ship that discharges the same amount into 
one port? In this case, detailed measures of implementation set out by 
industrial, commercial, scientific groups or NGOs can provide for the 
answer. This segment is referred to as ‘civil society’ in international law. 
Civil society articulates a collective opinion, which influences international 
law and in some cases the need to negotiate entirely new treaties.60 
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Soft law norms have developed through norm-setting processes. Soft law 
has been set out in order to guide behaviour, but is not of binding 
character.61 It is sometime hard to draw the line between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
norms since soft law can be used in practical legal reasoning of courts, 
states and other international actors.62  
 
The forms, functions and provenance are significantly different among soft 
law instruments. States, international organisations and international 
institutions make use of soft law instruments as tools to protect the 
environment. Actively involved international organisations in protecting the 
environment also adopt resolutions and declarations, which are non-legally 
binding.63  
 
Within soft law there is a ‘subtype’ referred to as ‘legally non-binding 
agreements’ made between states, which have replaced the former notion of 
‘gentlemen’s agreements’. This type of agreement was commonly made 
between states when there was an urge to reach rapid understanding without 
entering into legal commitments. Legally non-binding agreements have 
gained particular importance in the realm of international environmental 
law. These agreements can be categorised into following groups of 
arrangements; (1) accords on provisional treaty implementation; (2) codes 
of conduct replacing international legally binding rules; (3) political 
declarations on existing or emerging environmental principles and rules; and 
(4) political action programmes.64   
 
Another subcategory of soft law is memorandums of understanding 
(hereafter MOU), which are adopted when organisations and/or members of 
environmental agreements wish to co-ordinate individual efforts or to 
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undertake joint action in a specific matter.65 MOUs have arisen through the 
fact that not all international organisations have the international legal 
capacity to enter into treaties, or for initiation of treaty-making. Even in 
cases where parties have the legal capacity required for treaty-making they 
might prefer entering into a MOU, since it is more flexible compared to a 
treaty that needs to be approved by, and ratified by the domestic 
government, which easily becomes a drawn-out process.66 
 
The last subcategories of soft law are resolutions or declarations, which are 
used when international organisations express their will in documents of 
non-legal character. Resolutions and declarations do not fall under the scope 
of article 38(1) in the ICJ Statute, since they do not constitute any type of 
new or general source of international law. However, resolutions and 
declarations can have a powerful impact on the future and further 
development of international law, especially those adopted by consensus or 
unanimous vote in the UN General Assembly.67  
 
Resolutions and declarations adopted by the UN General Assembly through 
consensus, or even through unanimous vote, results in giving the documents 
a lot of weight in the international community. The resolutions and 
declarations from the UN General Assembly are always of recommendatory 
character, but can be one out of two characters: either (1) they are imposing 
broad environmental or development policy goals, like the World Charter 
for Nature,68 or (2) they are guidelines designed to steer the behaviour of 
states, like Resolution 62/98 named ‘Non-Legal Binding Instrument on All 
Types of Forests’.69  
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Beyerlin and Marauhn put forth that a minority of scholars have argued that 
some soft law instruments, such as the Stockholm Declaration and the Rio 
Declaration, might express an opinio iuris. They however agree that both 
declarations and resolutions ‘contains an impressive corpus of existing and 
emerging norms of the Centre for International Environmental Law’ 
(hereafter CIEL). The fact that some soft law instruments have functioned 
as catalysts for initiations of treaty-making makes the statement not entirely 
irrelevant. An example of such an instrument is the 1983 Food and 
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations’ International Undertaking 
on Plant Genetic Food and Agriculture, which led to the 2001 Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. In addition to this, 
another purpose of soft law is to urge actors operating in international law to 
take certain actions or to behave in a certain way.70   
 
The Rio Declaration belongs to the various soft law instruments in 
international environmental law. It is however clear that that some of the 
Rio Principles are customary international norms, whilst other principles are 
much further down in the hierarchy of international environmental norms. If 
principles are able to ‘produce direct or indirect steering effects on the 
addressees’ behaviour’, they can reach normative qualities and be 
considered to be part of customary international law. The principles 
considered to be part of customary international law are the ‘no-harm 
principle’, the ‘polluter pays principle’, the ‘precautionary action principle’, 
the ‘common but differentiated responsibility’, the concept of ‘sustainable 
development’, and the ‘intergenerational equity principle’, which are said to 
resolve the structure and objectives of international environmental law.71 
 
Despite the fact that resolutions or declarations have been adopted 
unanimously, they cannot be used as a base for claiming them to be an 
expression of, nor evidence of, opinio iuris. The only way to argue that a 
resolution or declaration is an expression of opinio iuris is if the behaviour 
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enacted in the documents has been observed by states in consecutive 
practice.72 
 
3.1.3 Why soft law?  
One of the reasons why states prefer using soft law instruments could be 
that a current situation needs a quick solution. A soft law instrument is 
faster to negotiate, and often does not face difficulties in obtaining national 
parliamentary approval, or any other national process. Another reason might 
also be that this type of arrangement allows for action despite a state’s 
unwillingness to enter into a legally binding arrangement. Following this, a 
non-legally binding agreement such as a soft law instrument can allow for a 
transitory solution for future entering into a legally binding agreement. 
Finally, it requires less effort to withdraw from a non-legally binding 
agreement than from one that is legally binding.73 
 
Soft law is not to be understood as mere politics, since it has to meet the 
same criterion as hard law, in the sense that soft law needs to have the 
‘capacity to steer directly and indirectly the conduct of its addressees’.74 
Hence, hard law and soft law often complement each other. It is this 
normative quality of soft law that distinguishes it from being mere politics 
or moral ideals. Non-compliance with soft law does not provoke a legal 
response, which stands in contrast with hard law. It will however provoke 
an international moral order, which means that breaches of soft law are of 
political and not legal nature. Nonetheless, occasionally there is supervision 
put in place to ensure compliance of soft law instruments that will activate a 
remedy.75 
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3.2 PART II – The evolution of sustainable 
development in international 
environmental law  
This second part of chapter 3 aims to deconstruct the concept and principle 
of sustainable development. Furthermore, in assessing the most essential 
principles that international environmental law revolves around, the purpose 
of this part is to provide an understanding of complexity of this area of 
international law. Lastly, this part will also contribute to build a foundation 
for the upcoming analysis in chapter 6.  
 
3.2.1 Sustainable development – from then to 
now  
Sustainable development is a concept sprung out of the field of international 
environmental law. In what follows I will present a timeline on how novel 
the concept is, how it came to be, and the contemporary interpretation and 
use of it.   
 
A core principle in international environmental law is sustainable 
development,76 which is argued to be ‘a crucial political concept that 
governs virtually every sphere of activity aimed at balancing and integrating 
economic, social and environmental policies’.77 In order to uphold this 
principle, the role of the state to actually achieving sustainable development 
is vital. Achieving sustainable development has been argued by Litfin to be 
threatened by issues of democracy,78 which might correlate with the 
eradication of the social contract caused by corruption.  
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From the first convention in international environmental law, Convention 
between France and Great Britain relative to the Fisheries (1867), up until 
1972, a shift in theoretical approach from a ‘utilitarian’ (anthropogenic) to 
an ‘ecological’ approach in international environmental law can be 
detected.79 Following this, two main characters can be subtracted from the 
International Environmental Law pre 1972, which are (1) important sub 
areas are not yet regulated by treaties and conventions such as air pollution 
and handling hazardous waste, and (2) environmental treaty making was 
dominated by industrial states, which meant there was no reference to the 
developing countries and their societies, economical or social needs.80 The 
contemporary international environmental law contains growing 
consciousness of the environmental threats caused by unprecedented global 
economic development, such as technological changes, expanded economic 
activities and the changing of the philosophical and ethical consensus.81  
 
The concept of sustainable development is novel; it dates back only to the 
beginning of the 1970s. The first landmark in the history of sustainable 
development was at the environmental conference in Stockholm 1972, when 
the linkage between environmental protection and economic development 
was acknowledged. This acknowledgement can be found in the UN 
Stockholm Declaration (1972), more precisely in principles 9,10 and 11. 
The principles in the declaration had to be understood as ‘compatible and 
mutually reinforcing goals’. Eight years later, the UN stressed in the UN 
General Assembly Resolution 35/56 on the International Development 
Strategy for the Third UN Development Decade of 5 December 1980, 
paragraph 41, that accelerated development in developing countries was 
needed in order to enhance their capacity to improve their environment. 
Furthermore, the importance of avoiding more future environmental 
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degradation was put forth, in order to be able to provide future generations 
with a sound environment.82     
 
The second landmark in the history of the concept of sustainable 
development followed in 1987, when the World Commission on 
Environment and Development released their report ‘Our Common Future’, 
which is commonly referred to as the Brundtland Report. The definition of 
sustainable development found in the report is as follows: ‘development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’.83 This is the most commonly cited 
definition of sustainable development,84 and refers to improving the quality 
of life in communities and for human beings through a process of change. 
Crawford states that it is said to be sustainable development when the 
integration of environmental, economic and social considerations provide 
for and protect the wellbeing of populations in a long-term perspective.85  
 
The third landmark in the history of the concept of sustainable development 
was at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (hereafter UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, where the Stockholm 
Declaration and the Brundtland Report together amongst other factors, laid 
the foundation to the Rio Declaration (1992) and Agenda 21. The aim of the 
Rio Declaration and agenda 21 was to establish ‘a new global partnership 
for sustainable development’ in the world.86  
 
The aim of the UNCED conference in Rio de Janeiro was to establish ‘a 
new global partnership for sustainable development’. Agenda 21 led to the 
creation of the Commission on Sustainable Development (hereafter CSD) 
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that was designated to enhance and rationalise the decision-making capacity 
on international environmental and development issues, and to ensure the 
pursuance of the conference in Rio de Janeiro. The UNCED marked the 
beginning of this new concept, and the creation of CSD showed a 
determination to implement it.87 
 
The forth landmark in the history of the concept of sustainable development 
was in September 2000 when the UN General Assembly adopted the 
Millennium Declaration,88 where goal 7 was entirely focused on 
environmental sustainability, which reaffirmed the UN General Assembly’s 
support for sustainable development.89 Following this, during the 2002 
World Summit in Johannesburg, the UN declared sustainable development 
to be a key component for their activities. Furthermore in Johannesburg, it 
was established that the concept of sustainable development consisted of 
three components working as mutually reinforcing pillars, which are linked 
to one and another; (1) economic development; (2) social development; and 
(3) environmental protection,90 reaffirming Crawford’s statement.91 The 
issue of corruption was highlighted at the Johannesburg conference as an 
impediment for the development of a society at the conference, where the 
participating states were given an opportunity to ‘express their 
determination to attack corruption’.92 
 
When the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the 2030 Agenda in 
2015, the three pillars of sustainable development were reaffirmed. The 
2030 Agenda is meant to function as ‘a plan of action for people, planet and 
prosperity’, where ‘eradicating extreme poverty in all its forms and 
dimensions, including extreme poverty, is [recognized to be] the greatest 
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global challenge and an indispensable requirement for sustainable 
development’.93  
 
The outcome of these four landmarks has concluded the definition of the 
concept sustainable development as a notion of; (1) the linkage between 
environmental protection and policy goals of social and economic 
development; (2) environmental protection as a qualified integral part of any 
development measure; and (3) the long-term perspective of ‘state’s 
intergenerational responsibility’ that widens the dimension of sustainable 
development.94 In addition, sustainable development has become an often 
included objective in regional integration treaties and general economic 
treaties.95   
 
Since the states wanted to stay away from the ethics it would take to create a 
universal charter for sustainability, civil society took it upon itself to initiate 
the work and produce the Earth Charter (2000) as an ethical framework for a 
sustainable, just and peaceful future. According to Bosselmann, the creation 
of the Earth Charter brought back the true meaning of sustainability, which 
he means got lost after the Brundtland Report. The Earth Charter has been 
referred to as the ‘universal charter’ that has been needed ever since 1987. 
The two main building principles of the charter are (1) ‘respect and care for 
community life’, and (2) ‘ecological integrity’, which are said to shape and 
give meaning to the concept of sustainability. Both the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (hereafter UNESCO) and 
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (hereafter IUCN) 
have endorsed the Earth Charter, and it was also used for the United Nations 
Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (2004-2014). These 
endorsements and uses of the Earth Charter are significant. Bosselmann 
                                                
93 United Nations, ’Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015 – 
Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ (A/RES/70/1, 
New York, 2015) preamble para 1. 
94 Ulrich Beyerlin and Thilo Marauhn, International Environmental Law (Hart Publishing 
Ltd, USA, 2011) 79. 
95 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edition, Oxford 
University Press, UK, 2012) 358. 
 30 
argues that sustainability has come to reach a status that allows for an 
examination of its legal status, he has even compared sustainability to be in 
the same rank as the fundamental norms of justice and freedom,96 since 
‘sustainability has the historical, conceptual and ethical quality typical for a 
fundamental principle of law’.97  
 
In the Case Gabçikovo-Nagymaros Dam (Hungary/Slovakia) from 1997 the 
ICJ agreed that sustainable development ‘is a principle with normative 
value’.98 By referring the parties to look at their case anew with 
consideration of the effects on the environment from the Gabçikov power 
plant, and in combination with previous statements, the ICJ did confirm that 
the concept of sustainable development has a legal function.99 
 
3.2.2 The importance of state sovereignty 
In the beginning of the 20th century state sovereignty was assigned unique 
value in the international sphere. At this point it was thought that 
international law was highly dependent on the express or limited consent of 
states, in the pretext that international law could not operate under the 
consent from human beings. Hence, states were thought to be the sole and 
exclusive subjects of international law.100  
 
State sovereignty refers to the ‘collection of rights held by a state’, whereas 
the entitlement to exercise control over its territory and the capacity to 
represent the territory and its people internationally. Specifically, state 
sovereignty characterises ‘powers and privileges resting on customary law 
which are independent of the particular consent of another state’. It is the 
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basic constitutional doctrine of international law. This means that the 
doctrine governs ‘a community consisting primarily of states having, in 
principle, a uniform legal personality’. Naturally, following from state 
sovereignty is a prima facie (presumptively) exclusive jurisdiction over a 
territory and its permanent inhabitants living there, the duty of non-
intervention in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of other states, and the 
dependence upon consent of obligations arising from either treaties, or 
international customary law.101   
 
From state sovereignty emerges equality of states. This is a prima facie 
(presumptively) exclusive jurisdiction over a territory and its permanent 
inhabitants living there, the duty of non-intervention in the area of exclusive 
jurisdiction of other states, and the dependence upon consent of obligations 
arising from either international customary law or treaties.102  
 
Despite the established notion of state sovereignty, it is often a target for 
conflicts within international law and can be summed up in terms of the co-
existence and conflict of state sovereignty. It is argued by Crawford that 
another perspective of state sovereignty can be that it implies discretionary 
powers within certain limited areas determined by law. Although the states’ 
capacity of deciding the conditions for nationality and determining the 
conditions for their borders for the territorial sea, the powers to do so are 
still depending on the compliance and conditions of international law. The 
principle of sovereignty and sovereign rights are often referred to as the 
legislative competence of a state over its national territory, thus it is 
connected to the question of jurisdiction of the state. What distinguishes the 
term from the recognition of state sovereignty is that it is not something that 
depends upon the consent of other states – it is powers and privileges 
deriving from international customary law.103 
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Surrendering some of the state sovereignty might facilitate problem solving 
when dealing with international environmental problems of transboundary 
nature. It is beyond the competence of a single state to defend itself from the 
damage, which is the reason for the creation of the complex structure of 
treaties and other bi- and unilateral agreements trying to solve and simplify 
the manner of solving international environmental problems.  In 
environmental policy, state sovereignty has been defended by states at all 
costs and has become a bone of contention. The European Union (hereafter 
EU) exemplifies a structure where states have done otherwise, and 
surrendered some of their state sovereignty. This has given the EU strength 
in environmental diplomacy as a result of the willingness of each member 
state to transfer some environmental competencies.104    
 
3.2.3 The principle of sustainability  
The concept of sustainable development derives from the principle of 
sustainability, which has been used to give form and meaning to sustainable 
development. Sustainability has been argued to be one of the most, if not the 
most, fundamental principle in environmental law. Furthermore, the 
principle of sustainability is not to be confused with sustainable 
development, since the two terms do not mean, nor refer to the same thing. 
Sustainable development refers to a development that is sustainable,105 and 
sustainability is the fundamental principle referring to ‘the duty to protect 
and restore the integrity of the Earth’s ecological system’.106 The concept of 
sustainable development obtained ‘its meaning and legal status to the 
principle of sustainability’.107 The concept of sustainable development has 
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been classified as a legal principle of international law, based on the 
normative character of the principle of sustainability.108  
 
The importance of international legal principles does not lie in their legal 
status, but in how they are interpreted by courts and governments. Despite 
their non-legal status, legal principles cause legal effects and can be 
enforced, hence their importance. Since international law is more complex 
than domestic law, it is widely understood and accepted that the spectrum of 
sources that are law-creating in international law, go beyond the sources 
listed in article 38 in the ICJ Statute. In the case of international 
environmental law, soft law is a great example of an important instrument of 
law. Even though soft law does not enclose legally binding qualities, it can 
generate in legal consequences and the steering of states behaviours.109  
 
According to Beyerlin and Marauhn, it has not yet been possible to 
determine whether sustainable development has reached normative status 
and therefore has become part of customary international law. However, 
they do put forth that ‘relevant doctrine shows a certain tendency towards 
considering sustainable development to be a concept somewhere in between 
a legally binding international principle and a mere political idea’.110 
 
3.2.3.1 The concept of sustainability  
International environmental law emerges from the general international law, 
where specialised treaties on the environment have been inserted in order to 
veil the deficiency that international law does not provide targeted problem-
solving for the environment.111 The width of sustainability and 
environmental law depends on how the environment is legally determined, 
whether it is determined narrowly or broadly. A crucial point in addition to 
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the determination of the environment is to understand the necessary 
ecological core of the sustainability concept. According to Bosselmann, 
there can be no sustainable development, there has to be an ecological 
sustainable development.112 Sustainable development is accepted as an 
integrated part of the international environmental law, as well as global 
policy.113 
 
Two essential consequences can be deduced form the concept of 
sustainability. (1) Sustainable development has been given direction and 
meaning, and (2) existing treaties, laws, and legal principles need to be 
interpreted in the light of the principle of sustainability.114  
 
To begin with, the first consequence is interpreted by Bosselmann to mean 
that developed countries have a greater responsibility than developing 
countries do, in the sense that there is ‘no free choice’ between economic 
prosperity, social justice or sustainable development. There is only one 
political goal, which is that ‘any use of natural resources has to be 
sustainable’.115 The two other political goals are secondary, despite the fact 
that some scholars argue for the reading that sustainable development 
balances these three goals equally. Through the interpretation suggested by 
Bosselmann, developing countries are given less responsibility than 
developed countries. This perception derives from the Rio Declaration and 
is referred to as ‘the principle of common but different responsibilities’.116 
The meaning of this principle is that developed countries bear a special, 
higher burden in comparison to developing countries for taking 
responsibility to eliminate, and reduce unsustainable blueprints in 
production and consumption patterns.117 
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 The second consequence of the concept of sustainability, is that it provides 
guidance on how to interpret legal norms and represents a foundational 
concept of emerging ‘sustainability law’. This means that the key for this 
guidance is ecological. This is the reason why Bosselmann states that there 
can be no sustainable development, but only ecological sustainable 
development.118  
 
3.2.3.2 The no-harm principle  
In cases where the damage leaps over borders and causes damage in 
another/ neighbouring state, is referred to as the transboundary problem. 
This type of damage is proven in practice to be puzzling to solve. In the 
Trail Smelter case (1942), a Canadian company entitled Trail Smelter 
pursued an activity that released sulphur dioxide into the air. This eventually 
led the United States to invoke Canada’s state responsibility for damage 
caused by air pollution.119 The arbitral tribunal in the Trail Smelter case 
defined the no-harm principle in such a way that no state has ‘the right to 
use or to permit use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by 
fumes in or to the territory of another’ state. The injury must be ‘of serious 
consequence‘ and established by ‘clear and convincing evidence’. 
Specifically, the no-harm principle establishes that states are responsible for 
causing transboundary harm to other/ neighbouring states’ territory.120  
 
There are two important features of the no-harm principle that was affirmed 
by the ICJ in the Pulp Mills Case.121 (1) Due diligence is required by a state 
in its territory, meaning that a state is ‘obliged to use all means at its 
disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in its territory, or in 
any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the 
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environment of another state’,122 which constitutes ‘the rule of prevention’. 
(2) The rule of prevention further means that a state is not only obliged to 
adopt rules and measures in order to prevent transboundary harm to other 
states, but also to have ‘vigilance in the enforcement and exercise of 
administrative control applicable to private and public actors’.123  
 
Since 1941, the no-harm principle has been refined and included in both the 
Stockholm Declaration,124 and in the Rio Declaration,125 which both 
reaffirmed the weight and importance of the principle.126 On numerous 
occasions the no-harm principle has been cited. A case which signifies the 
weight and importance of the principle, is the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hungary v Slovakia) case, where the ICJ in their judgement 
recalled the ‘the great significance that it [the no harm principle] attaches to 
respect for the environment, not only for States but also for mankind’.127  
 
In case of breach or non-compliance with the no-harm principle, a state will 
be responsible for having committed an internationally wrongful act. It will 
have to cease this act of continuous and the state is obligated to make full 
reparation for the injury caused by the wrongful act.128 Consequently, there 
is an entitlement of the victim state of significant damage to claim 
reparation from the state in non-compliance with the no-harm principle. 
This entitlement applies to all cases where states are pursuing wrongful acts, 
not only in cases where the no-harm principle is activated.129 
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One of the fundamental problems of international environmental law that 
has been discussed in the literature is the acknowledgement of responsibility 
after the damage has occurred, rather than focusing on preventive actions.130 
There is, however, a clear trend of focusing on issue-specific areas in order 
to solve the problem of prevention. This has, for instance, been done 
through articulation of international soft-law principles in dispute resolution 
processes specific to international environmental law. Despite the fact that 
some principles have been established this way, they cannot address 
prevention in the same way that a law-making treaty can.131  
 
However, the no-harm principle is deemed to have ‘immediate prohibitive 
and preventive steering effects’, and is classified as being of normative 
quality such as a rule rather than a principle. As a result of the wide use in 
international treaties, declarations of international organisations, in the 
codification work of the ILC, and in the jurisprudence of the ICJ – the no 
harm principle is considered to be a part of customary international law.132  
 
3.2.4 The shortage of international 
environmental law 
In comparison to other areas of international law, the area of environment 
has been perceived as underdeveloped. The reason for this perception 
appears to be that when international environmental law is compared to 
other areas of international law, there is a lack of a globally binding 
instruments in international environmental law that encloses fundamental 
rights and obligations established in writing is apparent.133 For example, 
globally binding instruments exist in international labour law,134 
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international human rights law,135 and international trade law.136 
Specifically, this means that ‘environmental rights and obligations are not 
codified’, except in certain areas, inter alia climate change and 
biodiversity.137   
 
Bosselmann argues that one possible explanation for this underdevelopment 
is that the right to use the environment is an integral part of state 
sovereignty, meaning that it is a political area, and that no state wants to 
touch upon one of the most fundamental and important principle in 
international law – the principle of state sovereignty.138  
 
The principle of sustainability and the concept of sustainable development 
are mentioned in several documents, from where states agreed upon finding 
solutions to certain problems for the global community. Amongst these 
documents are the Stockholm Declaration, the Brundtland Report, the Rio 
Declaration, the IUCN Draft Covenant on Environment and Development 
(1995),139 the Earth Charter,140 and the New Delhi Declaration (2002).141  
The IUCN and the Earth Charter have the same structure as fully developed 
constitutions (although they are not constitutions). The New Delhi 
Declaration is very useful as a guide in navigating in sustainability and what 
it means, since it defines some principles of sustainable development.142  
 
In the aftermath of the emergence of these documents, the UN has hosted 
the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development. The 
conferences from 2012 and 2015, where the outcome was the Rio 
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Resolution ‘The Future We Want’ (2012),143 and the Resolution 
‘Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ 
(2015) (hereafter the 2030 Agenda).144  
 
In the Rio Declaration it is stated that ‘[n]ational authorities should 
endeavour to promote the internalisation of environmental costs and the use 
of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter 
should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public 
interest and without distorting international trade and investment’.145 This is 
a statement of the ‘the polluter-pays principle’, one of the most important 
principles in international environmental law and a principle that actually 
leads to sanctions for the polluter.146 The polluter-pays principle has been 
recognised as a general principle of international environmental law.147  
Furthermore, the states resolve in the 2030 Agenda to ‘create conditions for 
sustainable, inclusive and sustained economic growth’, and ‘to ensure the 
lasting protection of the planet and its natural resource’.148 The envisaged 
world whilst creating the 2030 Agenda is one where, amongst other goals, 
economic growth, consumption and production patterns are sustainable in a 
world that respects the rule of law.149 
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One way of assessing the problem of re-establishing the damage done by a 
polluter, is the creation of the International Oil Pollution Compensation 
Funds (hereafter IOPC Funds). If oil pollution occurs in any of the member 
states of the IOPC Funds, the IOPC Fund provides for compensation if the 
damages derive from an oil tank that has spilled. Of the great majority of 
cases that has come to the IOPC Fund, all claims have been settled without 
having to take them to court.150    
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4 Corruption and the 
environment 
In this following chapter I will deconstruct corruption and show how it 
eradicates the social contract, why particularistic states need to change into 
universalistic states, how corruption correlates with larger amounts of 
pollution and how this can have an effect on a macro level. This will help to 
understand corruption and why it cannot be fought as a normal crime, how it 
is systematic and in how to find a plethora for it.  
 
In countries with large amounts of corruption, pollution has found to be 
higher in comparison to pollution in less corrupted countries. Results are 
further showing that some developing countries have been able to improve 
their economic and environmental performance by decreasing corruption.151 
In addition to this, according to an estimate from the non-profit group 
Global Financial Integrity, as much as $ 1 trillion vanishes from the 
‘developing world economics’ every year because of corruption.152 
 
Amongst various soft law instruments, the United Nations Global Compact 
Principles is a significant source that suggests that ‘sustainability begins 
with a principle-based approach to doing business’. The principles were 
created in order to make companies more sustainable in the longer-term by 
starting with a principle-based approach of doing business.153 The 10th 
principle addresses the need for anti-corruption instruments not only within 
governments, but also in companies by stating that ‘business should work 
against corruption in all its forms including extortion and bribery’. 
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According to the UN, companies should be concerned and care about anti-
corruption in a sense that they should first and foremost not be illegal, but 
also because of the reputational risk a company is taking by being corrupt 
and caught. Furthermore, the financial risks of being corrupt are huge; some 
countries lose up to $ 1 billion a year to corruption. This unethical 
behaviour leads to international mistrust against both the company and the 
home state.154 
 
4.1 Why corruption is bad  
In order to answer the question why corruption is bad, it is needed to first 
answer a pre-question: what exists in a liberal democracy but is missing in a 
corrupted one? The missing part in a corrupted state is the people’s 
expectation that justice actually will be done. Corruption destroys this 
expectation, and as a consequence, the ‘public trust in the powers that 
execute justice’ is destroyed.155 Corruption is known to be a large 
impediment for the development in a society.156 In a corrupt society where 
the treatment of citizens depends upon each person’s status or position, and 
where the expectation of justice has been replaced by the expectation of 
similar treatment to everybody with the same status, there will be certain 
groups that have monopolized the powers of domination and sources of 
income.157  A corrupted state is no longer run for the benefit of its citizens, 
but in the interest of a primary beneficiary, or several primary 
beneficiaries.158  
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4.1.1 How corruption eradicates the social 
contract  
In order to examine whether corruption eradicates the social contract or not, 
it is necessary to provide a clarification of what the social contract is. The 
social contract is defined as an implicit agreement between the members of 
a society (hereafter citizens) and the state, in which the citizens have 
denounced some of their individual freedom in exchange for state 
protection. Hence, it is an agreement in which the citizens ‘cooperate for 
social benefits’. In addition to this, the term social contract and the theory 
behind it has been used to describe the ‘the origin of government and the 
obligations of subjects’.159 Finally, the social contract can be applied not 
only to states, but also to corporations. The social contract is ‘essential for 
any organised behaviour in a group or community that is unwritten but 
agreed upon and establishes responsibilities and rights’.160 A state that is not 
corrupted is fulfilling its end of the social contract.161  
 
Key elements for states to pursue, in order to uphold the social contract 
between them and their citizens, are inter alia accountability, participation 
and transparency in their work and implementation of the rule of law.162 
 
The rule of law is what is controlling the social functions of a society. It is 
therefore essential that the rule of law is being upheld in order to create a 
functional society without any corruption. It is of great importance that the 
rule of law provides a matrix that gives incentives for public officials and 
managers of companies to make it rational to follow the law, more so than 
being corrupted. The unification of public interests is sprung out of the rule 
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of law, which also maintains the functionality of a constitutional democracy 
and contributes to the upholding of the social contract.163  
 
An example of the importance of upholding the social contract and one of 
its key elements is as follows. Provisions on the right to property has been 
said to be of key importance in order for a state to uphold the social 
contract, which in this context means that the state has limited powers to 
expropriate the land for public purposes, but also that the state is the 
‘guarantor’ for these rights to be upheld. In essence, it is the obligation of 
the state to protect the rights of the people to own their own land, and to 
protect this ownership from the state to unrightfully take that land for public 
purposes without any particular reason.164 
 
4.1.2 Particularism – a fatal system  
A system characterised by corruption is commonly referred to as 
‘particularism’. Corruption is systemic in such a system and imbedded in 
the system of the society – it is everywhere, the system becomes ‘a partial 
system of rule’. The opposite of particularism is ‘universalism’, which is 
characterised by being an ‘impartial system of rule’. The plethora for 
reducing corruption requires a revolutionary change in all institutions. In 
Sweden, Denmark, Hong Kong and Singapore, the change in institutions 
involved ‘all major political, economic, and social institutions’, where they 
managed to reduce corruption. This type of change in all major institutions 
at the same time is referred to as the ‘big push’.165 The key behind these 
reformations was that they were not only of a monitorial- and sanctional 
nature, but also down to grass-root levels of the society, leading to a new 
trust for the system. In other words, the expectation of corruption was 
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eradicated because wherever an actor turned, a resistance towards being 
corrupt was present. A trust for the other actors being honest and not 
corrupted emerged.166  
 
In the more recent examples from Hong Kong and Singapore, the change 
was made from the top and down. High level politicians showed the way by 
actions and setting examples, and not just by implementing new rules that 
they themselves did not follow – they walked their own talk.167 
 
The solution proposed by the anticorruption sector in order for 
particularistic countries to get a chance of improving and decrease the level 
of corruption in their countries, would be to duplicate the institutions of 
universalistic countries.168 But, according to Mungiu-Pippidi et al. it is ‘high 
time to realise’ that such a solution does not work, based on the fact that the 
winners in a particularistic country would oppose such a transformation, 
since it is inevitable that they would lose from an anti-corruption reform. 
Following this, the only proposed way to make a successful transformation 
would be ‘exposing and targeting predators’. An example could be by using 
media publishers that can see the benefits of exposing the corrupted actors, 
and in that way contribute to eradicate corruption.169  
 
A particularistic society treats people by virtue of privilege, and not based 
on their individual and universal membership. The United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (hereafter UNCAC) has started an evolution 
of the state-society relationship by no longer tolerating the legitimisation of 
a particularistic state.170 
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In the UNCAC, it is put forth in article 12 that states shall ensure that 
private enterprises have tools such as ‘internal auditing’ and ‘controls’ in 
order to facilitate the process of detecting corruption within the 
enterprise.171 Further, it has also been suggested by the UNCAC that states 
should make bribery illegal through their criminal laws within the private 
sector, covering both the offering and acceptance of bribes.172 The scope of 
application for the UNCAC comprises ‘public officials’ in government and 
international organizations,173 as well as the duty of a state to prevent 
corruption in the private sector.174 
 
If two states are unable to solve a dispute related to the UNCAC, they are 
encouraged to first try to settle the case by negotiation, secondly by 
arbitration, and finally if the dispute is not solved through arbitration within 
6 months, the parties have the right to submit the dispute to the ICJ.175 
 
There does not seem to exist a direct cure for corruption, but one thing that 
is for sure is that both the citizens and the state need to work towards a 
common goal of eradicating corruption. In order for them to achieve any 
result, it is essential that reciprocal accountability exist to uphold the social 
contract and as a consequence, eradicate corruption.176 
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4.2 Micro level – correlation between 
corruption and increased levels of 
pollution  
For those who pursue corruption, it is rational on a micro level. The 
rationality lies in the personal gain that the person who accepts, or offers, a 
bribe will get. This might be a higher salary, a larger bonus or a corporate 
deal before anyone else. This type of corruption is referred to as ‘situational 
corruption’, and in order to combat this type of corruption it requires that 
society make corruption irrational. In order to make corruption irrational, 
changes and restructuring of the political institutions have to take place. 
Hence, a restructuring of the rule of law is required. The reason the rule of 
law must be changed correlates with the fact that it is the law that ensures 
equal rights for everyone and it takes away the concept of ‘if you scratch my 
back I’ll scratch yours’, which prevails in a corrupted and particularistic 
society.177  
 
It is a question of curing the motivational drive for corruption. The society 
must, through laws and other measures, ensure its values, and make these 
abundantly clear in order to create a milieu where corruption is no longer 
rational. Governments and corporations can either increase sanction to deter 
corruption, or increase wages and bonuses so that the corrupt individual 
would not make a profit out of being corrupt, or do both.178   
 
The impact of corruption has been measured in two different areas: (1) the 
direct effect, which is the reduced stringency of environmental laws and 
their enforcement, and (2) the indirect effect, which is the reduced levels of 
per capita income in the country. Seen to the (2) indirect effect, depending 
on the income levels, corruption might reduce or increase pollution. To be 
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noted is the fact that the (2) indirect effect reinforces, in many cases, the (1) 
direct effect. It has been proven, that in some lower income countries 
corruption reduces income, which leads to lower income and higher levels 
of pollution.179  
 
The conclusion is that a reduction of corruption in lower income countries 
can lead to raise the affordances of a more environmentally friendly 
lifestyle, which the contemporary situation of corruption puts out of reach. 
Furthermore, a decrease in corruption is highly likely to also contribute to 
stricter environmental laws, and more rigid enforcements of those laws. 
Therefore, reducing corruption is perceived by Heinz to be of ‘key 
importance for improving environmental quality especially in developing 
countries’.180  
 
The empirical results of why anticorruption actions fail have been put forth 
to be due to the ‘collective action problem’,181 which highlights the problem 
of when, despite monitoring actions and sanctions, the citizens think that 
everyone else is corrupted. As a consequence, the incentives of being 
corrupted derive from the conviction that all of the other citizens allegedly 
are being corrupt.182  
 
The problem turns into a collective action problem when anti-corruption 
actions are to be implemented, where the obstacle is found in the 
‘coordination problem, where the equilibrium that emerges depends on 
shard expectations about others’ behaviours’. Once again, the conclusion 
falls back on the problem of what the actors expect the other actors to do. 
Persson even suggests that failed attempts to change the incentives for 
corruption can negatively affect the development in corrupt societies, since 
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it might enhance the perception and mistrust in the governance. A 
perception that most probably ends up strengthening the beliefs about other 
actors being corrupted, and in the end, that there is supposedly no cure for 
corruption. The actors in a corrupted state or organisation feel trapped in the 
bad spiral.183  
 
The UN Human Rights Council stated in 2009 that there is a duty for 
companies to prevent corruption in their supply chains through proactive 
action, since corruption has more recently been recognised as a violation 
against human rights.184 Social and economic development in a society are 
dangerously impacted by corruption, leading to the constant state of the 
poorest in the world remaining poor.185 
 
In a society, people have the right to self-determination, which is taken 
away in the presence of corruption. There is a right to live in a society free 
from corruption. As a consequence of the absence of self-determination, the 
right of a people to exercise sovereignty over their natural resources 
perishes.186  
 
Rothstein invented a new term: quality of government,187 which requires 
impartiality. In order to explain the term quality of government, a short 
introduction of the thought patterns behind it is needed. Governance consists 
of a relationship between the state and its citizens divided into two 
dimensions: (1) input, and (2) output. The (1) input, presents ‘rules about 
elections, party financing, the right to stand for office, and the formation of 
cabinets’. The (2) output, on the other hand, reveals the way the ‘political 
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authority is exercised’. It is in (1) input, where the access to political power 
lies and where the political content is forged. The founding regulatory 
principle of politics articulates that there is a need for political equality, 
which means that impartial treatment is essential in order to reach quality of 
government. If a state can manage to reach quality of government it will 
also reach a state of impartiality, which would bring back the trust in the 
system.188   
 
4.3 Macro level – a systemic political 
behaviour taken up a level  
When we are born, we inherit rights and obligations arising from the 
jurisdiction we were born into. As an example, it is illegal to steal from 
another person, to take something that does not belong to you. If everyone 
were to take the things they felt they had the right to, chaos would arise. 
Therefore, a society built on laws which constitute both obligations and 
rights, generates consequences when an individual oversteps the law. If a 
person steals something, they go to court and have to face the consequences 
of the action by paying a fine or going to prison. Specifically, all wrongful 
actions need to have consequences. It is the responsibility of a person living 
in that society to respect the law. The society has taken a stand of non-
tolerance against that particular crime in order to steer the individuals living 
in that society. This is the normative way of fighting and getting rid of 
crimes.189  However, corruption cannot be fought in the same way, which 
has been shown in the sections above, because it is imbedded on a systemic 
level in particularistic societies and requires different actions in order to be 
eradicated.  
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A particularistic state will ‘self-correct to maintain its corruption following 
a purge’; in the same way as a universalistic state ‘will self-correct to deal 
with corrupt individuals and the legislative or political flaws that facilitated 
their corruption’.190 This type of self-regulatory mechanism is what is 
holding systemically corrupted societies back from development and the 
ability to create democratic governance with an impartial rule of law.191   
 
In the field of corruption, a discussion has emerged initiated by Daniel 
Kaufmann on implementing the concept of ‘legal corruption’ in the 
definition of corruption. This might seem like a paradox, but what 
Kaufmann is aiming at is ‘how elites collude and purchase, or unduly 
influence the rules of the game, shape the institutions, the policies and 
regulations and the laws for their own private benefits’. According to 
Kaufmann, there should be no differentiating between if the corruption is 
pursued illegally or legally since the effect of the actions are the same – 
impediment to the development of a society and a partial application of the 
rule of law. The reason for this discussion is the financial crisis in 2008,192 
which does not have anything to do with the environment, but portrays how 
states have prioritized profit over the benefit of its citizens.  
 
Moreover, in the preamble of the UNCAC, an expressed concern about how 
corruption is ‘jeopardizing sustainable development and the rule of law’ was 
expressed, and a conviction that ‘corruption is no longer a local matter but a 
transnational phenomenon that effects all societies, making international co-
operation to prevent and control it essential’.193  The scope of application for 
the UNCAC comprises ‘public officials’ in government and international 
organizations,194 as well as the duty of a state to prevent corruption in the 
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private sector.195 Hence, corruption has been recognised to be a problem on 
a macro level and no longer an impediment that needs to be solved by states 
on a micro level.  
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5 Corporations and a 
questionable system  
The aim of this chapter is to show what type of responsibility that can be put 
on multinational corporations, how market oriented regulations has emerged 
as an effect of the eradication of the social contract and how the principle of 
superior responsibility and corporate social responsibility can be used in 
favour of sustainable development and put responsibility on corporations 
and states to eradicate corruption. This is put forth in order to come to a 
solution on how to improve the environmental responsibility of 
multinational corporations and how to eradicate corruption in the upcoming 
analysis. 
 
It has been put forth that there has been a paradigm shift of power from 
states to large multinational corporations. Much of the control over private 
actors’ activities has shifted from the states to the economic power state of 
multinational corporations. There are corporations that have larger annual 
revenues than the GDP of some countries. Such a company is for example 
General Motors that has larger annual revenue than the GDP of Thailand 
and Portugal.196  
 
Corporations might be able to double their dividend due to a pursuance of 
environmental protection, which is suggested not to be known to the 
industry. This has been proposed to be the reason why environmental 
governance within the industry today is mostly optional and not strictly 
regulated.197  
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Elias and Lee argue that some states are pursuing regulations of the 
liberalised kind in order to attract foreign investors, by creating so called 
‘market orientated regulations’198. These types of regulations are more open 
to corporate influence, such as the voluntary nature of some international 
regulations. One example of this is the UN’s Global Compact Principles, 
which originates from the creators being aligned with the expansion of 
capitalism, instead of with environmental protection.199  
 
The danger when governments start to be driven by economic gain is that 
the risk of neglecting the ecological losses from activities approved by the 
governments, increases in the pursuit for profit. The long-term perspective 
tends to be forgotten, and with it the long lasting damages on the 
environment from the profit-driven activities. A corporation seeking 
approval from a government is unlikely to not ponder the risks of long 
lasting damage to the environment due to their activities, if the government 
is not paying attention to environmental damages.200  
 
5.1 Market oriented regulations 
A market can be divided into three dimensions: (1) law and regulations, (2) 
practices and standards, and (3) norms and beliefs. The first dimension 
refers to laws passed by the government, regulations are more detailed rules 
derived from the laws passed by not only governments, but also by courts, 
agencies, self-regulatory organisations and the enforcement by these. The 
second dimension refers to practices as private sector behaviours, for 
example credit agencies, monitoring and bank groups, whilst standards 
refers to conventions in corporate governance, codes of conduct or technical 
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and accounting standards. The third dimension refers to norms as 
‘encompassing values’ like shareholder value, moral codes and company 
loyalty. The beliefs, however, refer to the political ideologies controlling the 
market, such as market liberalism, legal doctrines like the rule of reason, 
theories and efficient market thesis.201 According to Vogel, it is obvious that 
markets require regulations, not in order to function and flourish, but in 
order to avoid collateral damage such as environmental damage.202 Seeing 
this in the perspective of corruption, it might seem meaningless to try to 
regulate markets when the rule of law, more or less, perishes in 
particularistic societies where it becomes partial.203  
 
Market orientated regulations are a new type of re-regulation, involving 
different types of interventions in the market. What separates market 
orientated regulations from standard regulations, is that instead of requiring 
corporations to comply with a specific regulation, the corporations are left 
to respond to it.204 Corporations are left to respond to the intervention in the 
sense that there are always two sides of the regulation. The first side is that 
it ‘weakens rule-directed models of corporate governance in favour of 
process altering’, and the second side is that this type of re-regulation ‘eases 
state direction of business’.205  
For example, with a new tax reduction, a company can either choose to 
avoid it by moving its business to another country, or choose to stay and 
comply with the new regulation. In addition to this, the effect from the 
whole industry must be weighed against the environmental benefit of the 
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regulation in order to make sure that the environmental gain is larger than 
the economic loss.206  
 
Market oriented regulations have further been argued to be liberalised, to 
favour rule altering, and to weaken rule directed models of corporate 
governance. As a result, market oriented regulations are said to have started 
to straddle jurisdictions, such as regulations starting to be based on 
international rules instead of domestic ones. The new generation of 
regulation more often than not share a common base in EU and international 
law, hence the fact that the difference between different states’ regulations is 
less than before.207 The result of market orientated regulations is that the 
states are moving to indirect forms of regulations, instead of the original 
direct form,208 in their pursuance of attracting foreign investors.209 
 
In the pursuance of attracting foreign investors,210 some states have moved 
from direct regulations to indirect regulations such as market oriented 
regulations. When states take a ‘less interventionist approach to regulation’, 
instead of an interventionist approach that is creating incentives to act, and 
when states become self-restrained from such an interventionist approach, 
they create a ‘power vacuum which powerful multinational business can 
easily fill’. Such an effect arises from the fact that multinational 
corporations are not, through market oriented regulations, being subject to 
the discipline of the market in terms of enforcement and property rights. 
This effect is supported by global studies that have confirmed that some 
states are losing parts of their regulatory power to control the events in the 
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market within their borders, due to the power of multinational 
corporations.211  
 
5.1.1 The principle of superior responsibility 
and CSR  
Duties and obligations increase with rang, which has been recognised in 
international law through the principle of ‘superior responsibility’, where 
officers and military leaders of higher rank in military conflicts have been 
held accountable for actions they have committed. This principle has its 
origin in the World War II Nuremberg trials, where it was established by the 
courts. The court targeted individuals not only in the military, but also 
applied the principle to industrialists with higher rank, and in government. 
Hence, according to Higgins, this principle is applicable to the higher 
ranked people in corporations taking decisions that have led to the 
corporation pursuing damaging activities for the environment that are 
illegal. A corporation in itself cannot be liable for an illegal action, but the 
person responsible behind the decision can be.212  
 
Multinational corporations have a reputation of being able to avoid legal or 
fiscal regulation due to their global character of making business.213 When 
approaching this area of good business behaviour, it is important to 
remember that bad business behaviour is in fact more costly than good 
business behaviour.214 
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The term CSR, corporate social responsibility, is being used broadly and 
covers multiple areas, such as labour rights and human rights. In addition, it 
also contains a dimension of environmental responsibility. This dimension 
concerns inter alia pollution, waste management and climate change.215  
 
In the extension when a person commits the crime bribery, which is wrong 
and illegal, it is does not stop there. Extensive bribery can lead to an 
‘indirect distortion of economic development’, leading to a decreased access 
to both health care, education and welfare for a population that becomes 
deprived due to its corrupt citizens.216  
 
5.2 The responsibility of corporations  
Today we are consuming and using resources equivalent to 1.6 Earths. 
Furthermore, the World Business Council of Sustainable Development 
(hereafter WBCSD) has predicted that nearly 3 billion people will join the 
consuming middle class by 2030. This means, inter alia, that all 
stakeholders have a responsibility – including the corporations. In order to 
obtain a sustainable lifestyle, institution, rules, values and norms will have 
to change.217  
 
From the perspective of the protection of the environment, the responsibility 
of corporations becomes interesting as they are not states, nor citizens. 
When discussing state responsibility for a corporation, the notions of ‘home 
state’ and ‘host state’ need to be clarified. The home state is the state in 
which the corporation is registered, and the host state is the state in which 
the corporation is pursuing its economic activities. Corporations’ damaging 
economic activities will fall under the responsibility of both the host state 
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and the home state. Another parameter to be added in the discussion of who 
is responsible, is whether the corporation is owned fully or partially by the 
state, or if it is independent from state-owning – a private international 
corporation.218  
 
 In the case where multinational corporations cause harm to the 
environment, the problem becomes multidimensional in terms of norms 
being mixed both nationally and internationally, as well as between the 
public and private spheres. In addition to legal principles, international 
treaties and legal practices relevant for the application of international 
environmental law, it is also important to pay attention to bilateral 
investment treaties (hereafter BIT).219 
 
In the Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (2003),220 it is 
established that a corporation only has responsibilities ‘within their 
respective spheres of activity and influence’.221 The norms reflect customary 
international law and are therefore of importance.222 Further, when 
discussing the responsibility of a multinational corporation it is crucial to 
differentiate between state owned, mixed capital and private corporations. A 
state owned corporation is a corporation fully owned by the state, whilst a 
mixed capital corporation is partially owned by the state, and finally when 
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referring to a private corporation in this context, it is a corporation owned 
entirely by private parties.223 
 
The legal complexity of environmental cases lies in the issue of deciding 
what is an unacceptable risk, causation, classifying and identifying the 
victims who are to be compensated. Adding another layer of complexity in 
environmental cases is the need to prove that the specific activity in the case 
is causing harm to the environment. Since most environmental disputes need 
only an objective evaluation in order to prove their case, it is very difficult 
to do so when the scientific evidence is conflicting. For any adjudicatory 
body it is a challenging task lying ahead.224 
 
Multinational corporations work in different countries, and will therefore be 
affected by different jurisdictions. Another obstacle when trying to hold 
multinational corporations accountable for environmental damages is the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens.225 This is a common law doctrine that 
allows a court to deny jurisdiction at its own discretion on the basis that 
there is another court more appropriate as forum for the resolution of the 
dispute.226 
 
It might be easy to presume that a state’s responsibility to prevent 
environmental damage is limited to its own territory. This, however, is not 
correct since a state, through the no-harm principle, is required to take 
responsibility for cross-border environmental damage as well. This was 
affirmed by the ICJ in the advisory opinion ‘Reports of Judgments, 
Advisory Opinions and Orders – Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
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Weapons’,227 where it was established that ‘[t]he general obligation of States 
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part 
of the corpus of international law relating to the environment’.228  
 
Furthermore, the most important role of the host state is to ensure 
compliance of the domestic environmental legal framework. This obligation 
includes having appropriate legislation and effective enforcement, and to 
protect citizens from damaging acts that ‘can be perpetrated by private 
parties’.229 If a state refrained from taking necessary measurements to 
prevent serious damage caused on the environment through the conduct of a 
corporation, the state in such a case, could be held liable for the conduct of 
the corporation. An even stronger case can be made if the corporation is 
state-owned, or mixed capital.230  
 
There have been a couple of attempts to hold multinational corporations 
liable in their home states for economic activities pursued abroad that have 
caused environmental damages, but so far there has been no success due to 
‘jurisdictional hurdles’.231 Despite this fact, the home state does, according 
to Zyberi, have a responsibility to a forum for adjudicating environmental 
disputes.232 
 
In cases where the host state is either unwilling or unable to hold a 
corporation accountable for the environmental damage it has caused, the 
accountability of the state reveals a gap where actors that do not respect that 
law can slip through. Zyberi argues that in order to ensure compliance with 
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the minimum environmental standard, it is a responsibility that should be 
shared between the home state, the corporation and the host state.233 Despite 
the fact that the legal process is complex and protracted, companies have 
been held liable for serious environmental damage.234   
 
5.2.1 The limited effect of soft law  
The terminology of ‘soft law’ is an instrument or provision that holds such 
importance in the legal framework of international legal development that it 
requires particular attention.235 Soft law and hard law have in common the 
capacity to steer directly, or indirectly, the conduct of their addressees, 
which is known as having ‘normative quality’. It is this normative quality 
that distinguishes soft law from mere ideals and politics.236 
 
Despite the quite impressive amount of international soft law regulating 
how multinational corporations should conduct their business in order to be 
sustainable and environmentally friendly, the effect of the regulations in 
practice is limited. The reason for the limited effect has been argued by 
Bonfanti to be (1) the non-binding status of soft law, in combination with 
(2) the lack of an adjudicatory body to supervise how the countries are 
following their commitments. The result is a dependence on the goodwill of 
companies to follow the soft law established in the international 
community.237 
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In an attempt to try to constitute a definition of a crime against future 
generations called ecocide and move away from soft law, Higgins has put 
forth the necessity of a clear phrasing such as ‘conduct which places the 
very survival of life at risk should be prohibited and prosecuted as an 
international crime’. An inclusion of this definition into the Rome Statute 
would not only make it illegal across the world to deplete and exploit 
natural resources to the extent where nature no longer can reconstruct itself, 
but it would also give the ICJ jurisdiction to try such a crime, since it could 
constitute a causal link that is missing today. An inclusion would also lead 
to an obligation for a member state to ‘investigate, arrest and prosecute 
perpetrators’.238  
 
5.2.2 Wal-Mart in Mexico and bribery  
Wal-Mart Stores Inc, one of the largest retail companies in the world, is 
under scrutiny for corruption in Mexico. There has been an alleged 
accusation of building permits obtained through bribery that has had 
negative consequences for Mexico. These permits have included at least one 
environmental permit that led to the construction of a building in a flood 
basin which was classified as ‘environmentally fragile’. The corrupt 
payments are estimated to have reached an amount of $ 24 million.239   
 
More often than not, multinational corporations are not subject to 
international law, but only to the law of the home state, despite the fact that 
the home state might not be the country of operation. As a result of the 
Maastricht Principles on Extra-territorial Obligations of States in the Area 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter the Maastricht 
Principles), multinational corporations can now be held accountable for 
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violations of human rights abroad from the jurisdiction of their home state. 
Unfortunately, the lack of an adjudicatory body that can supervise the 
implementation creates a flaw within the principles, which results in a 
dependence of the goodwill of the states to choose whether to follow the 
principles or not.240  
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6 Analysis  
In the following analysis I have attempted to conclude all of the findings of 
this thesis in order to contextualise how the global degradation of the 
environment, corruption and multinational corporations are interlinked in a 
problematic area where there is a need for change.  
 
6.1 Being smart and business oriented, or 
neglecting the social contract  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, market oriented regulations are 
argued to be liberalised, to favour rule altering, and to weaken rule directed 
models of corporate governance. As a result, market oriented regulations are 
said to have started to straddle jurisdictions, in the sense that regulations 
have started to be based on international rules which has led to a decreased 
difference in states’ regulations. 
 
As a result, in the pursuance of attracting foreign investors, some states have 
moved from direct regulations to indirect regulations such as market 
oriented regulations. When states take a less interventionist approach to 
regulation, it has been put forth that they create a power vacuum which 
powerful multinational business can easily fill. Such an effect arises from 
the fact that multinational corporations are not, through market oriented 
regulations, being subject to the discipline of the market in terms of 
enforcement and property rights. This effect is supported by global studies 
that have confirmed that some states are losing parts of their regulatory 
power to control the events in the market within their borders, due to the 
power of multinational corporations. Following this, the effects of market 
oriented regulations are twofold: (1) it ‘weakens rule-directed models of 
corporate governance in favour of process altering’, and (2) it ‘eases state 
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direction of business’. Multinational corporations are in a situation where 
they are left to choose how to respond to a regulation: if the regulation does 
not please their perceived preeminent way of making profit, the corporations 
are free to move their business elsewhere – to a host state. 
 
Market liberals argue that governmental regulation of the market it threatens 
to the personal liberty of the actors in the market (i.e. multinational 
corporations), and that such regulations can be better suited to capture those 
actors who are in the market to find the system most beneficial for their own 
benefit. Furthermore, private actors may seek monopoly benefits by 
lobbying the government to favour them. A market less regulated can 
potentially be an open playing field where the strongest would survive, and 
where a society based on status would dominate, since such a structure 
would allow for primary beneficiaries making the rule of law partial to arise. 
 
According to Vogel, it is obvious that markets require regulations, not in 
order to function and flourish, but in order to avoid collateral damage such 
as environmental damage. Seeing this in the perspective of corruption, it 
might seem meaningless to try to regulate markets when the rule of law, 
more or less, perishes in particularistic societies where it becomes partial. 
The social contract is fulfilled only in universalistic states, and not in 
particularistic states. Some of the required key elements to uphold the social 
contract are accountability, participation and transparency. Following this, 
to create a plethora for corruption the state needs to make corruption 
irrational by eradicating the incentives to be corrupt and doing this through 
accountability, participation and transparency. This is essential for a society 
that wants to uphold the social contract, and therefore its social functions, 
through having rule of law that is impartial. A matrix needs to be provided 
so that public officials and managers of multinational corporations do not 
(1) have a reason to be corrupt, and (2) do not expect anyone else to be 
corrupt. 
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This way of acting corresponds with the examples presented from Hong 
Kong and Singapore, who both managed to lessen corruption in their 
societies, by making the change from the top and down. High-level 
politicians in these states showed the way by actions and example-setting, 
not just by implementing new rules that they themselves did not follow – 
they walked their own talk and by doing so, decreased the expectation of 
everyone else being corrupt. It is crucial to change the citizens’ perception 
that everyone else is corrupt into the expectation that everyone else is not 
being corrupt by making the rule of law impartial. 
 
A solution proposed by the anticorruption sector in order for particularistic 
countries to get a chance of improving and decreasing the level of 
corruption in their countries, would be to duplicate the institutions of 
universalistic countries. But as mentioned in chapter 4, according to 
Mungiu-Pippidi et al. it is ‘high time to realise’ that such a solution does not 
work. This statement is based on the fact that the winners in a particularistic 
country would oppose such a transformation, because it is inevitable that the 
winners would lose from an anti-corruption reform. The only way to make a 
transformation successful would be by ‘exposing and targeting predators’. 
An example of this could be by using media publishers who comprehend the 
benefits of exposing corrupted actors on the way to eradicate corruption, and 
are willing to take the risk. 
 
Since corruption eradicates the social contract in a society, the natural 
question that follows is how to reconstruct the social contract in a corrupt 
society. After having assessed empirical research, Rothstein and Tannenberg 
have proposed a solution based on ‘reasonably well-established empirical 
indicators’ that involves changes in five essential institutional devices: (1) a 
functioning system of taxation, (2) universal education, (3) meritocracy, (4) 
gender equality, and (5) national auditing. The main common consequence 
of changes within these institutional devices is impartiality, which leads to 
trust and the perception that everyone is treated equally no matter their 
origin or status. The founding idea is that a society should treat every citizen 
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with equal respect and concern, and an impartial application of the rule of 
law makes this possible. This empirical research has a clear connection to 
the successful changes made in Singapore and Hong Kong, where the top 
politicians led the change and understood the importance of impartiality. 
Specifically, that everyone in a society is equal to the law, that every case 
should be treated alike, and that each and every citizen should get his or her 
rights.   
 
Rothstein comes to a conclusion pointing out the fact that ‘there can be a 
market for anything as long as there is not a market for everything’. The 
essence of the conclusion is, as long as there will be a market for corruption 
where everything is for sale, the markets will not reach their ultimate 
economic efficiency and, therefore, poor countries will remain in poverty. 
The solution provided in order to eradicate corruption on a micro-level is to 
make it irrational for the actors: would it be possible to apply the same 
solution on a macro-level in order to eradicate corruption at an international 
level?  
 
The UN highlighted at the World Summit in Johannesburg 2002 the 
importance of eradicating corruption due to the obstacle it poses to the 
development of societies; an opportunity was given to the participating 
countries to express their determination to attack corruption. In the 
Johannesburg Declaration, corruption was declared to pose a severe threat to 
sustainable development, hence, sustainable development has a connection 
to corruption and it has been recognised at an international level. 
Furthermore, the UNCAC is perceived to be the start of an evolution of the 
state-society relationship by aborting the legitimisation of particularistic 
states. In the foreword of UNCAC, it is stated that corruption ‘undermines 
democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distort 
markets, erodes the quality of life and allows organized crime, terrorism and 
other threats to human security to flourish’. Moreover, in the preamble of 
the UNCAC, an expressed concern about how corruption is ‘jeopardizing 
sustainable development and the rule of law’ was expressed, and a 
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conviction that ‘corruption is no longer a local matter but a transnational 
phenomenon that effects all societies, making international co-operation to 
prevent and control it essential’. As the scope of application for the UNCAC 
comprises ‘public officials’ in government and international organizations, 
as well as the duty of a state to prevent corruption in the private sector, it 
can be applied on a macro level in order to target multinational corporations 
that pursue damaging environmental activities.  
 
From my objective perspective, this portrays an awareness of the problem at 
an international level, and a willingness to make an effort of eradicating 
corruption from the international community. An effort is made to change 
the perspective of business from not only profit, but also to the environment, 
sustainable development and the future of our society. In addition to this, 
eradicating corruption would help reconstruct the social contract in states 
where it vanished a long time ago. This would bring back justice, a trust for 
the state and give every person his or her rights back which they have 
previously been denied. In doing so, the citizens would get back their right 
to live in a sustainable environment that would be protected accordingly to 
the existing rules of environmental protection.  
 
6.2 Walking the talk – using international 
law to curb the development   
Customary international law is a powerful instrument, although it can be 
imprecise and time consuming to create. Today, the most common way to 
create new rules in international law is through the making of treaties, which 
is also perceived to be both faster and more precise than relying on 
customary international law. The key of making corruption seem irrational 
is to impel actors to abide the law for the sake of their own interests. 
Following this, treaties might be the solution for eradicating corruption on 
an international level, and in doing so, allow for the environmental 
standards to be raised.  
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A way to eradicate, and try to reform, a corrupted society lies in a theory put 
forth by Rothstein, who was inspired by the so called ‘evolutionary gaming 
theory’, which brings about a realistic notion of how humans make 
decisions and enact them into the world. The ‘evolutionary gaming theory’ 
is based on the fact that humans do not always know everything, and can 
therefore not make rational decisions. Everywhere one turns, there must be a 
new perception about corruption – that it is not accepted under any 
circumstances and that no one pursues corruption anymore. In order to make 
this change possible, it has to happen everywhere at the same time through a 
‘big push’. This theory stands in contrast to former theories in the anti-
corruption sphere that have promoted changes to be made gradually, which, 
according to Rothstein, only leads to moving the corruption into another 
institution. 
 
The goal is to move from ‘particularistic practices to universalism and 
impartiality’, which can be done through a ‘big push’. Since a particularistic 
state will ‘self-correct to maintain its corruption following a purge’; in the 
same way as a universalistic state ‘will self-correct to deal with corrupt 
individuals and the legislative or political flaws that facilitated their 
corruption’, it is crucial make the change through a ‘big push’ so that the 
system do not get time to self-correct itself.  
 
So is there a solution? Bringing forth this example from Ecuador, the only 
country to have made the Universal Declaration of Human Rights part of 
their constitution, has through that incorporation at the same time made the 
rights of the nature part of their constitutional protection. Through a project 
called the Yasuní-ITT initiative, Ecuador managed to remove all oil 
extraction from the Yasuní National Park in order to preserve one of the 
most biodiverse regions on Earth, in combination with being number 117 on 
the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2017 from TI, this achievement is 
remarkable. This poses the question whether Ecuador has managed to curb 
the constraint development of environmental protection by implementing an 
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international declaration into their constitution? Would it be possible to 
duplicate this action and in that way give the environment better protection 
and at the same time decrease corruption, which would allow multinational 
corporations to pursue environmental damaging actions in a state? Ecuador 
has for certain raised the protection of the Yasuní National Park by 
implementing the protection of the park into their constitution. However, if 
the corruption has lessened in the country, and if the environmental 
protection rules are being applied with stringency, is hard to establish. On a 
second note, it might even be easier to proceed with corruption behind a 
large improvement like this due to the fact that the outer world might not 
expect it, which could be taken advantage of.  
 
Due to the fact that more often than not, multinational corporations are not 
subject to international law, but only to the law of the home state, the 
emergence of the Maastricht Principles arose. Multinational corporations 
can now be held accountable for violations of human rights abroad from the 
jurisdiction of their home state. Unfortunately, the lack of an adjudicatory 
body that can supervise the implementation creates a flaw within the 
principles, which results in a dependence of the goodwill of the states to 
choose whether to follow the principles or not.  
 
If a violation of the environment took place in Ecuador, it would constitute a 
crime against human rights as a result of the implementation of the human 
rights charter in their constitution. Following this, it would give jurisdiction 
to prosecute the corporation operating in a host state and provide the link to 
the Maastricht Principles that is missing today, which would give the ICJ 
jurisdiction of such a violation.  
 
Using legal instruments in international law, such as the no-harm principle, 
the polluter pays principle and the principle of superior responsibility, is 
another way of leading up to legal consequences for a polluting state. 
However, these principles will only solve environmental problems and are 
furthermore the next step after having attacked the problem of corruption. 
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The correlation between corruption and environmental degradation is 
present and needs to be handled as one problem, since they are interlinked in 
many cases, but not exclusively interlinked. Specifically, there can be 
corruption without environmental degradation, and there can be 
environmental degradation without corruption. The issue of interest is when 
these two are interlinked and when corruption has weakened the 
environmental protection and increased the environmental degradation as a 
result of corruption.    
 
6.3 What can we do different?  
The sources listed in article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, constitute the base for 
the jurisdiction of ICJ; international treaties; international customary law; 
general principles of law; and ‘judicial teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as a subsidiary means for 
determination of rules of law’. A consequence of a non-participating state in 
a treaty is the inability to invoke a dispute based on the treaty towards that 
particular non-participating state. International disputes can only be invoked 
between parties to a treaty. Although, if an international customary rule is 
arguably the same as that contained in the treaty this problem might not 
arise. 
 
The judgements from the ICJ are not considered to be a source of law in the 
strict sense. However, with a coherent body of judgements, they are 
regarded as evidence of law. It is stated in article 59 of the ICJ Statute that 
the judgements of the ICJ have ‘no binding force except between the parties 
and in respect of that particular case’. According to Crawford, this refers to 
the particular question of intervention, and not to major questions that form 
a judicial precedent. 
 
The importance of the sources of the ICJ is relevant if the ICJ were to have 
jurisdiction in environmental and corruption cases. In such a case, the ICJ 
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would be the missing adjudicatory body that could put up a coherent body 
of judgements within both environmental crimes and corruption. In some 
cases, like with Wal-Mart, the ICJ would have the chance to give guidance 
in cases where an environmental crime had been committed through 
corruption.  
 
In her attempt to try to constitute a definition of ecocide, Higgins has put 
forth the necessity of a clear phrasing such as ‘conduct which places the 
very survival of life at risk should be prohibited and prosecuted as an 
international crime’. An inclusion of this definition into the Rome Statute 
would lead to an obligation for a member state to ‘investigate, arrest and 
prosecute perpetrators’. According to Bonfanti, this is part of the solution 
required to increase the alleged lack of effect of soft law in the international 
community. In combination with the pursuance of UNCAC and its 
recognition of corruption as an impediment to sustainable development, this 
would provide a base for starting the eradication of corruption and as a 
result, provide increased protection of the environment against multinational 
corporations.  
 
Important to bear in mind is however that corruption cannot be eradicated in 
the same way as traditional crimes, since it is imbedded in the system of 
how a society works. It will require ‘revolutionary change in institutions’ in 
order to change the perception of how the actors in a society will act, 
specifically, to change the expectation that all other actors are corrupt. The 
citizens in a particularistic state have to realise that there is a ‘new game in 
town’. Trust and reciprocity in combination with monitoring and 
sanctioning are vital in the progress of change, following this – both formal 
and informal mechanisms of control are needed in the revolutionary change 
that attempts to eradicate corruption. Unfortunately, the question of how to 
make this type of change is unanswered, the conclusion is that the 
international community will have to serve as an ‘external principal’ until 
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the answer to this question has been found.241 What has been noticed in this 
area is that the examples mentioned in this thesis: Sweden, Denmark, Hong 
Kong and Singapore, are all small states which made it easier to make a 
revolutionary change. The conclusion of this observation leads up to 
question of how to duplicate this systemic change on a larger scale.  
 
6.4 A non-interest of development 
Within the principle of state sovereignty is the territorial sovereignty 
principle, which is today prioritized above the welfare of our global world. 
The territorial sovereignty principle is a guarantor of state-control over the 
territory within its borders. Protecting ones interests by using environmental 
laws in a state does not mean protecting the environment, it means 
protecting the interests of the state within the territory of the state. 
Consequences arising from this state-centred system are a dominance of rich 
states over poor states because of the focus on state territoriality. We are 
borrowing from the next generation by prioritizing the needs of today, with 
no intention of paying back what we have borrowed. The human need is put 
before environmental needs, and the needs of future human generations.   
 
International law has created new obligations beyond treaty law, which has 
set out some limitations for the state sovereignty. Taking this concept 
further, Bosselmann suggests an idea where the state acts as a trustee or 
guardian, in order to limit the territorial sovereignty. This idea is based on 
the approach that the environment is not territorial, but global, hence the 
states should have responsibility over the entire environment and not only 
over the environment covered by state territoriality. The entire environment 
meaning not just what is perceived to be of global importance, but the entire 
environment. An approach like this would capture the environment within 
                                                
241 Anna Persson et al., ‘Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail – Systemic Corruption as a 
Collective Action Plan’ (2013) 3 Governance An International Journal of Policy, 
Administration, and Institutions 466. 
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the territorial jurisdiction, since this solution does not creates a difference in 
the state guardianship if the state has rich or poor natural resources.242  
 
In addition to this, the discussion initiated by Kaufmann on implementing 
the concept of ‘legal corruption’ in the definition of corruption is very 
interesting. According to Kaufmann, there should be no differentiating 
between if the corruption is pursued illegally or legally since the effect of 
the actions are the same – impediment to the development of a society and a 
partial application of the rule of law. The reason for this discussion is the 
financial crisis in 2008, which does not have anything to do with the 
environment, but portrays how states have prioritized profit over the benefit 
of its citizens. Kaufman has attempted to extend the definition of corruption 
in the purpose of catching all types of behaviour that can be perceived as 
being corrupt. The question that he tries to answer, according to my own 
reflections is, why should be distinguish corruption pursued by only public 
officials, when the behaviour of top managers have a lot in common with 
the behaviour of a corrupted public officials. 
 
Furthermore, such a definition of corruption could help implement 
multinational corporations into the concept of corruption when managers 
take decisions to move the production to developing countries in order to 
exploit their environment so that they can increase their profits. Today, it is 
legal to have a home state and operate in a host state because the host state 
provides legally more beneficial standards in order to make a larger profit. 
Specifically, in the host state, which allegedly has lower environmental 
standards, the method of production might be allowed, but assessing it from 
a holistic perspective with the 2030 Agenda, the actions do not align with 
those purposes. Following this, with such a definition as the one proposed 
by Kaufmann, this type of behaviour would be seen as corrupt and would be 
illegal.  
 
                                                
242 Klaus Bosselman, The Principle of Sustainability – Transforming Law and Governance 
(Ashgate Publishing Ltd, England, 2008) 168. 
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7 Concluding remarks 
We are borrowing from the next generation by prioritizing the needs of 
today, with no intention of paying back what we have borrowed. The human 
need is put before environmental needs, and the needs of future human 
generations.  
 
The inclusion of the importance of fighting corruption on an international 
level and moving from the local level is exactly what is needed in order to 
understand the importance of eradicating corruption. An effort is made to 
change the perspective of business not only from profit, but also to the 
environment, sustainable development and the future of our society.  
 
Fighting corruption in the world is essential if we want to reach the level of 
sustainable development that the international community is aiming for. In 
Sweden, we tend to forget our history of being a particularistic society and 
how we made a shift from that into being the universalistic country we are 
today.  
 
The correlation between corruption and the constrained development in the 
international environmental law does correlate, but it is not because of its 
lack of regulations or principles that aim to protect the environment. It is 
because of how corruption turns the rule of law into being applied partially, 
only when someone with the right status decides it should be applied, or not 
applied for that matter. The fact that the UN no longer recognises 
particularistic states as a legit way of conducting a society, is a great start 
and it is moving in the right direction. The following step is to figure out 
how to actually implement the ‘big push’ on a larger scale, something that I 
might be able to answer in the future.   
 
 
 
 77 
Bibliography 
Official documents  
European Central Bank, ‘Annual Report 2004’ (ISSN 1725-2865, Germany, 
2004) 
Earth Charter Commission, ‘The Earth Charter’ (Paris, 2000) 
International Court of Justice, ‘Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions 
and Orders – Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’ (ISBN 92-
1-070743-5, Hague, 1996)  
International Law Association, ‘International Law Association’s New Delhi 
Declaration of Principles of International Law relating to Sustainable 
Development (New Delhi Declaration) (New Delhi, 2002) 
International Law Commission, ‘Draft articles on Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities with commentaries’ 
(Geneva, 2001) 
International Law Commission, ‘Draft articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries’ (Geneva, 2001) 
International Law Commission, ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts’ (Geneva, 2001) 
International Labour Organization, ‘Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention 1949 (No. 98)’ (Geneva, 1949)  
International Union for Conservation of Nature, ‘Draft International 
Covenant on Environment and Development’ (2-8317-0288-7, Gland, 1995) 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Corruption – A 
Glossary of International Criminal Standards’ (Paris, 2007)   
United Nations, ‘Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial 
Accidents, done at Helsinki, 17 March 1992, as amended on 19 March 
2008’ (ECE/CP.TEIA/25, New York and Geneva, 2013) 
United Nations, ‘Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Human 
Environment (Stockholm Declaration) (A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, Stockholm, 
 78 
1972) 
United Nations General Assembly, ‘World Charter for Nature’ 
(A/RES/37/7, New York, 1982) 
United Nations, ‘Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ 
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 2003) 
United Nations, ‘Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 27 July 
2012 – The Future We Want’ (A/RES/66/288, Rio de Janeiro, 2012) 
United Nations, ’Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 
September 2015 – Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development’ (A/RES/70/1, New York, 2015) 
United Nations, ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’ 
(A/CONF.151/26, Rio de Janeiro, 1992) 
United Nations, ‘Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda For 
Sustainable Development’, (A/RES/70/1,New York, 2015) 
United Nations, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1949’ (Paris, 
1948) 
United Nations, ‘United Nations Convention Against Corruption’ (New 
York, 2004) 
United Nations, ‘United Nations Handbook on Practical Anti-Corruption 
Measures for Prosecutors and Investigators’ (Vienna, September, 2004) 
United Nations, ‘United Nations Millennium Declaration’ (September, 
2000) 
United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development, ‘Johannesburg 
Declaration on Sustainable Development’ (A/CONF.199/20, Johannesburg, 
2002) 
World Bank, ‘GUIDELINES On Preventing and Combating Fraud and 
Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and 
Grants’ (October 15, 2006) 
World Commission on Environment and Development, ‘Report of the 
 79 
World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common 
Future’ (Oslo, March 20, 1987) 
World trade organization, ‘General Agreement on Trade in Service 1994’ 
(Marrakesh, 1994)  
 
Guidelines  
World Business Council of Sustainable Development, ‘Futures Thinking – 
A guide to using futures to help drive corporate resilience and 
transformational innovation’ (2014, Geneva, Switzerland) 
 
Books 
Anthony Aust, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) (Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public Law, UK, 2015, MPEPIL 1498) 
Julio Barboza, The Environment, Risk and Liability in International Law 
(Martinius Nijhoff Publishers, Netherlands, 2011) 
Ulrich Beyerlin and Thilo Marauhn, International Environmental Law (Hart 
Publishing Ltd, USA, 2011) 
Patrik Birkinshaw, ‘Global Transparency’ 137-161 in Charles Sampford et 
al., Rethinking International Law and Justice (Ashgate Publishing Ltd., UK, 
2015) 
Angelica Bonfanti, ‘Accountability of Multinational Corporations for 
Human Rights and Environmental Abuse: How Far Can Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Go? 151-178 in Charles Sampford et al., Rethinking 
International Law and Justice (Ashgate Publishing Ltd., UK, 2015) 
Klaus Bosselmann, The Principle of Sustainability – Transforming Law and 
Governance (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, England, 2008)  
Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edition, Oxford 
University Press, United States, 2008) 
Neil Carter, Politics of the Environment: Ideas, Activism, Policy 
(Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2007) 
 80 
James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th 
edition, Oxford University Press, United Kingom, 2012) 
Juanita Elias and Robert Lee, ‘Ecological Modernisation and Environmental 
Regulation: Corporate Compliance and Accountability’ 163-181 in Sorcha 
MacLeod, Global Governance and the Quest for Justice – Volume 2: 
Corporate Governance (Hart Publishing, USA, 2006) 
Chang-fa Lo, Treaty Interpretation Under the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties – A New Round of Codification (Springer, Singapore, 2017) 
Polly Higgins, Eradicating Ecocide – Exposing the corporate and political 
practices destroying the planet and proposing the laws to eradicate ecocide 
(2nd edition, Shepheard-Walwyn (Publishers) Ltd, 2015) 
Andrew Hurrell, ‘International Political Theory and the Global 
Environment’ 129-153 in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds), International 
Relations Theory Today (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995) 
Fredric Korling and Mauro Zamboni, ’Juridisk Metodlära’ (Studentlitteratur 
AB, Lund, 2013) 
Karen Litfin, The Greening of Sovereignty in World Politics (MA:MIT 
Press, Cambridge, 1998) 
Vaughan Lowe, International Law – A Very Short Introduction (Oxford 
University Press, UK, 2015) 
Harris Robert, Political Corruption in and Beyond the Nation State 
(Routledge, UK, 2003)  
Bo Rothstein and Marcus Tannenberg, Making Development Work: The 
Quality of Government Approach (Elanders Sverige AB, Stockholm, 2015) 
Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (7th edition, Cambridge University 
Press, United Kingdom, 2014) 
Gentian Zyberi, ‘Ensuring the Protection of the Environment from Serious 
Damage. Towards a Model of Shared Responsibility between International 
Corporations and the States Concerned?’ 67-90 in Bård A. Andreassen and 
Võ Khán Vinh, Duties Across Borders – Advancing Human Rights in 
Transnational Business (Intersentia Ltd, United Kingdom, 2016) 
 81 
Articles  
Yasutomo Morigiwa, ‘Making Deivery a Priority:A Philosophical 
Perspective on Corruption and a Strategy for Remedy’ (2015) 6 The World 
Bank Legal Review 437-455  
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Becoming Denmark: Historical Designs of 
Corruption Control’ (2013) 80(4) Social Research – Corruption, 
Accountability, and Transparency 1259-1286 
Alina Mungiu–Pippidi, ‘Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment’ (2006) 17(3) 
Journal of Democracy 86-99  
Anna Persson et al., ‘Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail – Systemic 
Corruption as a Collective Action Plan’ (2013) 3 Governance An 
International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 449-471. 
Bo Rothstein, ‘Anti-Corruption – A Big Bang Theory’, (2009) QoG 
Working Paper Series 2007:3, ISSN 1653-8919. 
Bo Rothstein, ‘Anti-corruption: the indirect ‘big bang’ approach’ (2011) 
18(2) Review of International Political Economy 228-250. 
Heinz Welsch ‘Corruption, growth, and the environment: a cross-country 
analysis’ (2004) 9 Environment and Development Economics 663-693  
Internet sources 
Oxford Dictionary, ‘social contract’, retrieved: 2018-04-12 
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/social_contract> 
The Law Dictionary, ‘social contract’, retrieved: 2018-04-12 
<https://thelawdictionary.org/social-contract/> 
Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perception Index 2017’, retrieved: 
2018-05-20 
<https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_
2017#table> 
Transparency International ‘What We Do’, retrieved: 2018-05-20 
<https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption> 
 82 
United Nations Global Compact, ‘The ten principles of UN Global 
Compact’, retrieved: 2018-04-24 <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-
is-gc/mission/principles> 
United Nations Global Compact, ‘Principles 10: Anti-Corruption’, 
retrieved: 2018-04-24 <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-
gc/mission/principles> 
Victoria L. Lemieux, ‘Is technology good or bad in the fight against 
corruption?’, (2015) retrieved: 2018-04-11 
<http://blogs.worldbank.org/governance/technology-good-or-bad-fight-
against-corruption> 
Worldbank “Combating Corruption” – retrieved: 2018-05-20   
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption> 
 
 83 
Table of Cases 
(United States v. Canada) (1938 and 1941) 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 
Case Concerning the Gabçikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 
1997 ICJ, 37 ILM 162 (1998).  
Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 
2010 ICJ, (2008) ISSN 0074-4441 
Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) (Merits) 1986 ICJ, General list No. 
70.  
 
 
 
